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The role and effectiveness of Board of directors in fostering 
innovation is an area of keen interest for both academics and 
professionals. Heterogeneity research suggests that diverse 
groups consider a broader range of perspectives and hence 
are able to foster creativity and drive innovation. The focus of 
most prior research on board diversity has largely been on 
gender, and the outcomes have been generally inconclusive.  
In addition, previous research efforts have focused on the 
RBV (Resource based view) in terms of the board role and 
also in explaining the diversity relationship with innovation. 
This study extends the diversity, governance and innovation 
literature , beyond generic gender diversity, and beyond the 
RBV view by examining the relationship of organizational 
innovation with newly introduced experience based diversity 
constructs like “Dynamic Capability Diversity” , “Information 
diversity”, and “Governance diversity” at the board level. The 
longitudinal study, used a sample of data consisting of 209 
unique and global firms, spanning over an eight-year period, 
and the results demonstrate that the innovation outcomes of 
an organization have a curvilinear relationship with Dynamic 
capability diversity and Information diversity. The study results 
also indicate support for the “contingency view” by showing 
that the influence of the diversity elements is contingent upon 
the firm’s board size. This study also brings forth the 
 
importance of understanding the interactions between the 
different diversities. This study extends the understanding of 
the challenges around board composition, board diversity and 
board governance with respect to innovation as we discuss 
the implications for both practice and academic research. 
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SECTION 1  INTRODUCTION 
The secret of change is to focus all of your energy, 
not on fighting the old, but building on the new.“ 
Socrates (470-399 BC), Philosopher 
  
In today’s world, the economic perspectives are increasing the focus on 
the capabilities of firms to be able to consistently and constantly innovate 
and derive incremental financial value. Interest in the role of executive 
diversity increased dramatically after Hambrick and Mason postulated 
their Upper Echelon Theory and many studies have since examined the 
effects of demographic components of diversity like age, gender, race of 
the top management teams on firm performance. With the increasing 
focus of corporate governance and the emerging importance of the role 
of the board of directors, researchers have looked at similar effects of 
diversity on firm performance beyond the TMT and extended it to 
diversity among board members. However the studies that have focused 
on relationship between diversity and innovation are still quite limited  
(Van der Vegt & Janssen, 2003) (Ostergaard, Timmermans, & 
Kristinsson, 2011). The first purpose of this research was to make a 
theoretical and empirical examination of the linkage between diversity of 
the and firm innovation. We extend the work in these areas by going 
beyond the TMT diversity and firm wide diversity to specifically examine 
the issue from the perspective of diversity of Board of directors. While 
the diversity issue  has generally been looked at from “surface level 
diversity” or “deep level diversity”, we specifically examine diversity 
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through multiple constructs – demographic construct, information 
/cognitive construct, dynamic capability construct and the governance 
construct with respect to their relationship with innovation. Previous 
studies on the relationships of diversity and creativity and team 
performance have given mixed and inconsistent  empirical results with 
some studies supporting the positive relationship as proposed by Bentel 
and Jackson (Bantel & Jackson, 1989) and some reflecting negative 
relationships  (O'Reilly, Snyder, & Boothe, 1993) 1993 (Miller, Burke, & 
Glick, 1998). We believe that this is driven by a few reasons. First, most 
of such research is done on a cross-sectional basis and that approach 
has limitations in terms of causality determination, and hence we have 
taken a longitudinal approach in this study. In addition, many of the 
previous studies look at the relationship from the perspective of a single 
theoretical construct which could be Resource based view, the Agency 
theoretical view, or the Communication and social interaction view or the 
Social identity theoretical view. We have looked at the diversity and 
innovation relationship through a multiple theoretical perspective 
wherein we indicate how different theoretical constructs involving 
resource based view, dynamic capability view, agency view, cognitive 
diversity view, social identity view and the corporate governance 
theories all fit in one multi theoretical approach and  their interactions 
and inter relationships define the relationship of diversity with firm 
innovation.  In addition, this study posits the structural contingency 
approach and provides the analysis of the moderating effects of board 
size on the diversity – innovation relationship. 
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1.1  Innovation  
In every field of economic activity, businesses are facing new and 
complex challenges requiring continuous improvements in performance. 
Firms today are facing multiple challenges driven by changes that are 
extremely fast paced. In the uncertainty driven ecosystem of business, 
every organization is constantly looking for potentially radical ways to 
create a sustainable differentiation with its competitors. Innovation plays 
a very important role in determining firm performance (Torchia, Calabro, 
& Huse, 2011) . Innovation has now not only become the central  
strategic element for business strategy but is considered critical for 
organization’s current and future existence (Zahra & George, 2002) 
(Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004) . Firms are being forced to focus on 
innovation because of the dynamically changing competitive strengths 
of the industry (Porter, 1985)  and by the changes that are happening 
outside the industry (Goffin & Mitchell, 2010).  
 
“Innovation is the adoption of any idea, process or behavior, which is 
new for the organization” (Daft, 1978), (Damanpour & Evan, 1984) 
(Damanpour, 2010) , and at the same time it is also seen as  a 
recombination or an improvement of old ideas into something that is 
perceived as something new or improved (Van de Ven, 1986). As 
innovation is the key antecedent to the firm’s success (Covin & Slevin, 
1991), it becomes imperative that we study the antecedents of firm 
innovation to allow us to develop a deeper understanding of the critical 
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conditions that are necessary in driving organizational success (Zona, 
Zattoni, & Minichilli, 2013).  
 
1.2  Leadership 
Another issue which has fostered great debate among and management 
theorists is the issue of the importance of the role of Leaders in an 
organization and the manner in which the firm’s leadership engages with 
its different stakeholders. (Covin & Slevin, 1991)  (Bantel & Jackson, 
1989). While there has been a minority view that leaders in an 
organization have limited powers and they do not have the ability to 
control the systemic and environmental factors that impact 
organizational direction (Aldrich, 1979), it is also widely believed  that 
the leaders of an organization do hold strong decision making powers, 
and hence it is the leaders of the firm who determine the success and 
failure of the organization (Weiner & Mahoney, 1981). Management 
research on leadership  has focused on the role of CEO in driving firm 
performance and innovation. We believe that the Board of directors, 
which has legal responsibilities for the management of the firm, plays a 
vital role in establishing a “connect” between the firm and its external 
operating environment, and has an overall strategic responsibility for the 
firm. The Board of directors is today essentially seen as the strategic 
leadership of the firm. Therefore it is critical that firms need to understand 
how boards play a key role in driving organizational innovation.  
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Fundamentally, the boards are effectively a group of  “individual” 
decision makers  who are thus tasked with the responsibility of making 
collective decisions with respect to the organization. This concept then 
throws up the key question that how do the individual characteristics of 
the different board members impact their thinking and analysis of a 
situation as they make their individual choices that contribute to the 
board decisions and firm innovation? 
 
1.3  Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity of the organization is therefore another facet of increasing 
relevance for organizational innovation and firm performance. Both 
academic researchers and management practitioners have 
demonstrated interest in finding the characteristics of team members 
that have an influence on the team’s performance (Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004). Higher levels of heterogeneity are 
understood to help increase the differences in the perspectives of the 
working groups within the firm and allow the groups to consider multiple 
approaches to the group activity. This heterogeneity view, when 
observed from the Resource Based theory lens, looks at firms and 
businesses ( especially large firms) as open systems which use the 
processes of information and resource exchange with the environment 
to create sustainable competitive advantage through innovation in 
product and processes. In any group, the cognitive conflict  (which arises 
from the difference in thoughts, opinions, ideas, beliefs of the group with 
respect to the group tasks), is a key driver of the quality of the decisions 
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made by the group  (Ding & Yang, 2014). The core belief is that a 
broader  resource pool for the group leads to higher cognitive conflict 
and more effective analysis and  decision making by the group. 
 
In the context of the board of directors of a firm, the same philosophy 
reflects that higher diversity among the board members breeds higher 
cognitive conflict contributing to a variety of opinions and views amongst 
the board members  leading to better understanding of the business and 
environmental complexities  (Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 1991). Over the 
years, therefore many organizations have incorporated diversity in their 
workforce with a view to augmenting the problem solving processes 
(Chatman & Flynn, 2001).  
 
The results of such attempts have only achieved a mixed bag of 
outcomes because  research on group and team interactions has also 
shown that there are other potentially challenging effects of incorporating 
heterogeneity. The heterogenous  groups in many studies experience 
issues in coordination, cohesion  and team work ,especially when they 
are handling complex activities (Zeigler, Dielh, & Zijlstra, 2000) .The 
board of directors as a group are generally tasked with intricate decision 
making activities. The complicated strategic decisions required of them 
become more complex because the boards usually don’t meet very 
often, and generally have to make decisions while operating with difficult 
time constraints. The challenges at the board become even more 
labyrinthine, when the board members’ interactions are looked at from 
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the Social identity and Social categorisation theory perspective. 
Individual board members tend to associate themselves with a “specific 
identity”,  based on certain real or perceived group memberships (Tajfel, 
1978). Such identification and categorization leads to sub-group 
formation and  inter-group biases, which create barriers and boundaries 
of thought as well as minority-majority levels and  power-status 
differentiation among members (Tajfel & Turner, 1985). This culminates 
in dysfunctional group-interactions, with reduced level of questioning, 
incomplete and biased analysis and lack of resource sharing. Therefore 
heterogeneity can drive  poor board cohesion , create challenges in 
terms of identifying the problem, understanding the issues, and 
analysing the potential solutions leading to poor creativity and reduced 
innovation for the firm.  
 
1.4  Corporate Governance  
The innovation complexity hence extends beyond the resource-pool 
dynamics of the board of directors. Less than one fifth of new product 
innovations succeed (Crawford, 1987). Innovation as a strategy remains 
fraught with risk (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996) and it remains difficult to 
execute, needs resource alignment, adaptation to constant change and 
has a long term time frame of reference (Lee & O'Neill, 2003). It is 
important therefore to also understand as to how the board members 
visualize their role in such context. Analysing the issue from the 
corporate governance perspective, the Agency theory reflects that the 
interests of the management/ executives of the firm and of the 
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shareholders are not necessarily aligned all the time (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Also, the results of investments in innovation are generally long term in 
orientation. These time frames may not align with executive objectives 
and hence the board is tasked with ensuring that the shareholder interest 
is protected against any managerial opportunism (Lee & O'Neill, 2003). 
This determines the board members’ role as focused on risk 
management and control.  
At the same time when the board role in corporate governance  is viewed  
through the resource perspective, the board is expected to provide a 
wide range of capabilities, knowledge and networks to allow it to perform 
its strategic and advisory role and help in value creation.  
The Board of directors thereby plays a multi-dimensional and crucial role 
for the firm: 
a. by providing resources and pools of information, networks, skills, and 
experiences to increase the knowledge base, the cognitive quotient 
and broaden the perspective of intellectual capital of the firm and the 
absorptive capacity of the organization. 
b. by ensuring that it manages to synergize the organizational interest 
and protect shareholder interest by monitoring the management 
effectively. 
c. by ensuring that it reviews the inputs from management, overlays it 
with its own information from its networks, and through its own 
consultative review and engagement, decide on the resource 
allocation to manage current and future R&D and innovative initiatives 
(Wincent, Anokhin, & Boter, 2009). 
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d. by managing its decision-making processes to ensure that the 
personal values, beliefs and attitudes of the individual members and 
their differing backgrounds, and experiences do not create social 
categories and stereotype led biases causing group think which would 
reduce solution orientation and weaken creativity and cohesive 
execution resulting in poor innovation. 
 
To summarize, we see that  innovation is a key driver for the long term 
strategy, value creation and success of the firm; that the board of 
directors is the key strategic leadership team of the firm playing a crucial 
role in managing the firm; and that board activities and decisions (like of 
any other team) have a strong dependence on board composition and 
diversity. Therefore  it is no surprise that board level diversity is one of 
the most critical governance issues faced by modern corporations 
(Milliken & Martins, 1996).   
 
1.5  Approaches to diversity: Surface level diversity, deep level 
diversity, job related diversity 
 
Though the importance of diversity, board and corporate governance is 
well established, there is no clear consensus among academics and 
social scientists in terms of the definition of innovation and the approach 
that should be applied for establishing the appropriate framework. This 
is largely because academics have made efforts to “oversimplify” the 
construct of team diversity (Bell, Villado, Lukasic, & Belau, 2011). For a 
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very long time, diversity was either viewed as surface level diversity 
(generally observable differences like gender, age, race),  or as deep 
level diversity (which largely refers to attributes that are more difficult to 
observe like socio-economic background, values, beliefs  etc.) (Milliken 
& Martins, 1996),  (Torchia, Calabro, & Morner, 2015). Pelled  (Pelled, 
1996),  then extended the argument that the diversity of a team should 
be studied with respect to function and job related differences defined 
on the basis of job-related attributes (Educational and functional 
backgrounds) or  “less job-related” attributes (gender, sex, race etc.) 






1.6  The merit principle & representation principle of board  
 composition 
 
While the Board is responsible to make decisions that have a role in 
determining the firm’s current business and financial performance and in 
determining its future strategies to maximize the interest of the 
shareholders (Carver, On Board Leadership, 2002), the board is also 
responsible for the societal engagement of the firm ( (Keasey, 
Thompson, & Wright, 1997) and organizations are generally expected to 
reflect the values of the society in which they operate.  
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Based on the above, there are two core principles related to diversity 
that matter in the context of the board - The merit principle and the 
representation principle (van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). The 
representation principle is based on the social responsibility theory / 
stakeholder view wherein the board composition should reflect the 
composition of the society at large and ensure social justice. The merit 
principle is based on the shareholder view that the board composition 
should reflect the distribution that brings individuals with certain 
characteristics which will be of value to the firm especially in resolving 
issues and challenges of policy (Burton, 1991). 
 
1.7 The “experiential” orientation in our study 
 
While most existing studies on diversity look at observable/demographic 
and non-observable (cognitive diversity) characteristics (Milliken & 
Martins, 1996), we posit that it is important to delve deeper into the 
composition of the board and antecedents of the diversity elements to 
build a framework that allows us to explore the relationship between 
diversity and innovation.  
 
We especially extend the thinking of the merit and the representation 
principle in our research whereby we indicate that it is these special 
experiences which drive the skill / merit of the board members with 
respect to their ability to drive innovation. We focus on developing a 
deeper understanding these  “merit experiences” by classifying them as 
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cognition driven Information experiences, Dynamic capability 
experiences , and Governance Experiences and we also explore the 
different nature of their relationships with firm innovation through the lens 
of board diversities with respect of each of such special experiences . 
We also in parallel explore the effect of representation principle – which 
is largely governed by gender etc. as drivers of social composition and 
the effect of board diversity on such demographic ( representation ) 
diversities on firm innovation.   
 
1.8  The Classification of the Key experiences of the Board  
members 
  
The experiences and backgrounds that have generally been considered 
in most research efforts have been focused on functional backgrounds 
(e.g. marketing, operations, sales, finance, etc.) and industrial 
backgrounds ( e.g. consumer, technology, manufacturing, commodities 
etc) (Torchia, Calabro, & Morner, 2015). While there has been some 
prior support to these vectors as part of background diversity of board 
members , there is also the important question regarding the difference 
in role of management (TMT) and the role of the board.  As we have 
articulated earlier, the role of the board is at the strategy and resource 
allocation level and the board is generally not supposed to find solutions 
to operational problems and not to solve functional and departmental 
issues or to build operational and functional synergies. 
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Therefore it is critical that the board and the management should not 
reflect the same set of skills and backgrounds because such a scenario 
will be ineffective and dysfunctional. 
We therefore believe that while it is important for the TMT to focus on 
functional background and industrial background diversity, the board 
needs to look at a different set of experiences.   
 
 
1.8.1  Information experiences:  
The resource based view of board governance and the resource based 
view of diversity / heterogeneity  both highlight the criticality of wide pool 
of “information” availability for board effectiveness.  
 
1.8.1(a). Higher education: 
 
Higher education reflects higher human capital through knowledge, skills 
and expertise (Brandenburg, Gunther, & Schneider, 2007).The  human 
capital perspective indicates that better educated people  are more 
competent in the use and exploitation of new technologies (Nelson & 
Phelps, 1966). Not only do higher educated graduates operate as strong 
basic innovators themselves, they can also perform as effective second 
stage innovators who have better abilities to exploit technological 
progress. (Lundvall & Johnson, 1994). A diverse team with high 
qualifications therefore deepens information and expertise in a group to 




1.8.1 (b). Educational Institutional backgrounds:   
It is well recognized that Institutions of learning are responsible for 
developing knowledge, skills and competencies amongst their students. 
Institutions also recognize that a significant part of education is outside 
the structure of the classroom. The external interactions with the 
institutional environment influences the thinking and learning of the 
students (Gurin, 1999). The curriculum and specific pedagogical 
interventions have a positive impact on the critical thinking capabilities 
(Macphee, Kreutzer, & Fritz, 1994). Having a variety of such experiences 
enhances the information/ knowledge pools built from exposure to 
multiple institutions. This will build a resource pool that will add strongly 
to the analytical and the creative capacity of the board and foster 
innovation. 
 
1.8.1 (c). Networks:  
It is also well established that human capital is rooted in social networks 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). The capabilities of the board members in 
terms of knowledge and information are acquired through their internal 
and external network i.e. their social capital (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). The 
board enhances the organizational cognitive quotient and absorptive 
capacity by the extent of networks and potential interactions of the board 
members, thereby impacting firm innovation. 
 
We therefore postulate that  “Information experience” – driven by 
higher education, multiplicity of institutional exposure and professional 
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networks should have a significant relationship with the ability of the 
organization to drive innovation. 
 
1.8.2  Dynamic Capability Experiences  
Dynamic capability view is an extension of the Resource based view of 
the firm, wherein it is believed that it is not just the availability of the 
resources but the ability of the firm to “integrate, build and reconfigure 
internal and external competencies/capabilities “ that allows the firm to 
successfully innovate and address the rapidly changing environment. 
(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). The capability of the firm to be able to 
continuously alter its resource base allows it to continuously change, 
adapt and hence innovate. It has been established that for firms to be 
able to achieve breakthrough innovation, they need to focus on the 
development of the firm’s dynamic capabilities (Michailova & Zhan, 
2015).   
  
Classification of dynamic capabilities 
The dynamic capabilities have a set of key components that allow them 
to:  
“(1) Sense and shape opportunities and threats  
(2) Seize the opportunities and    
(3) Transform  i.e. reconfiguring the business enterprise’s 
intangible and tangible assets” (Teece, 2007)  (Diaz-Fernandez, 
Bornay-Barrachina, & Lopez-Cabrales, 2015). 
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The dynamic capabilities of the firm also reflect in the form certain 
identifiable and specific routines which include: 
a. Capabilities to integrate resources including human resources 
from varied skills and backgrounds (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000) 
b. Capabilities to make analytical choices and strategic decisions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) 
c. Capabilities to reconfigure the firm’s resources through 
replication and brokering (Hansen, 1999).  
d. Capability to re-allocate the firm resources (Eisenhardt & 
Brown, 1999)(  
e. Knowledge creation routines that allow the firm to develop its 
key dynamic capability of building new thinking (Helfat , 1997) 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) 
f. Capabilities to build alliances and partnerships (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000) 
g. Capabilities to forge mergers and acquisitions (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000) 
h. Capabilities to manage exit strategies allowing firm to 
abandon and reject unsuccessful and/or unnecessary 
resources or combinations of resources (Sull, 1999) 





Dynamic capabilities and innovation  
We take the view that the dynamic capabilities of the firm are an asset 
of the firm which allow the firm to have the capability to adapt to change 
through innovation (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). Firm innovation relies on 
its knowledge, attitude and creativity and “this view is in line with the 
asset position of dynamic capability” (Parashar & Singh, 2005). Dynamic 
capability has been accepted to be seen as a pre-condition for the 
innovation capability of the firm (Bresnik & Hisrich, 2014). 
Fundamentally, the most significant aspect of the dynamic capabilities is 
the higher order capability of being able to learn how-to-learn, and that 
then allows the firm to be able to innovate more effectively (Collis, 1994) 
(Bresnik & Hisrich, 2014). 
 
Since the Board of directors of the firm is the strategic decision making 
body, we believe it is the “dynamic capabilities of the board” that allow 
the firm to sense new opportunities and challenges, seize these 
opportunities and then reconfigure the firm’s business to innovate and 
transform itself continuously. While dynamic capabilities are very difficult 
to observe in an organization (Diaz-Fernandez, Bornay-Barrachina, & 
Lopez-Cabrales, 2015), there are certain experiences of the board 
members , which we classify as Dynamic capability experiences , 
which are a set of specific and identifiable experiences – 
Entrepreneurship, Leadership and Research, which are idiosyncratic in 
themselves but have commonalities in mechanism based on the 
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dynamic capability view, through which they operate and drive firm 
innovation.  
 
1.8.2 (a)  Entrepreneurship 
The  entrepreneurial activities of a firm are those that focus on 
“identifying and exploiting” the potential opportunities (Zahra, Sapienza, 
& Davidsson, 2006). Reconfiguration of resources, reallocation of 
resources, developing alliances, building acquisition and exit routines 
are among the key dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) and 
they have a close association with Entrepreneurship.  “Sensing” is one 
of the critical components of the dynamic capabilities and an 
entrepreneur has to be agile in his/ her capability to be able to 
continuously scan and identify market opportunities.  Entrepreneurs 
become successful because they are able to seize the opportunities that 
come their way. Furthermore, entrepreneurs have to be able to pivot in 
terms of products, processes or business models to be successful. 
Successful entrepreneurs challenge the status quo, look for new 
opportunities, take risk and build new businesses through finding new 
solutions, build critical partnerships to solve current problems or create 
new opportunities by continuously innovating at every step.  
 
1.8.2 (b)  Leadership 
Key leadership positions in an organization e.g. the CEO, are recognized 
as critical factors regarding the firm’s ability to recognize opportunities & 
challenges, and to make decisions that impact organizational processes 
 19 
(Ling et al., 2008). While it is important for organizations to have the 
required technological knowledge, R&D capabilities as well as the 
necessary skills in marketing and  distribution, they also must have the 
right leadership to drive the innovation process. (Oke, Munshi, & 
Walumbwa, 2009). Leaders embrace change and transformational 
leaders create an environment supportive of disruption and accepting 
failure. Transformational CEOs/ Leaders  track and filter information and 
build hypothesis with reference to market trends, review ongoing and 
expected competitive behaviours and they therefore exhibit the sensing 
capability that drives firm dynamic capabilities. CEOs and business 
leaders also make business decisions that require unbiased strategic 
and analytical analysis on the challenges and opportunities facing them 
and thereby they reflect the “seizing element” of firm dynamic capability.  
In addition, CEOs are able to marshal the resources that they have to be 
able to reorient the firm towards the revised strategic goals thereby 
reflecting the “transformational element” of firm dynamic capability. 
Transformational leaders therefore reflect a style that has a positive 
relationship with the firm dynamic capability (Diaz-Fernandez, Bornay-
Barrachina, & Lopez-Cabrales, 2015).   
 
1.8.2 (c) Research 
The process of innovation is intricately linked to the ability to not only use 
existing knowledge, but also requires the capability to generate and 
acquire new knowledge (Mukherjee, Dey, Guin, & Sinha, 2005) through 
research. Extraordinary research is based on quest for knowledge which 
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is exploratory in nature and pushes the boundaries of normal science 
(Kuhn, 1970) and such thinking and research leads to formation of new 
paradigms which plays a crucial role in innovation. The knowledge 
creation routines which allow the creation of new knowledge and a new 
way of thinking develop a vital dynamic capability in a firm. (Helfat , 1997) 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Academics and researchers bring this 
critical experience for the firm which allows for the improvement of the 
learning process for the firm and an increment to the overall knowledge 
base of the firm thereby enhancing firm dynamic capabilities and 
improving firm innovation.  A key factor in the knowledge creation 
process for the firm is also the ability to keep strong information flow by 
maintaining active linkages with the external knowledge ecosystem. 
Active and direct research experience at the board allows the 
development and maintenance of a robust knowledge network and 
thereby providing a strong support to the sensing element of the firm 
dynamic capabilities. 
   
We thereby believe a diverse composition of  “Dynamic capability 
experiences” of entrepreneurship, leadership and research should have 







1.8.3 Governance experience:  
 
1.8.3 (a).  Board vintage: 
Two factors that have a strong impact on the innovation outcome of an 
organization are “uncertainty” ( this is dependent on the pace at which  
technology is changing , the dynamics of the market are evolving etc.)  
and “complexity” ( which is a reflection of the level of organizational 
interdependency) (Tidd, 2001; Drucker, 1985). Longer term for members 
on the board of directors also adds to board cohesion, prevents the firm 
from making resource allocation errors and improves board 
effectiveness (Nutt, 2002). It is also important that Innovation be seen 
as a process that has to be highly managed for success rather than 
simply looking at it as an outcome that is driven by acts of  personal / 
individual excellence or in response to random / sporadic brilliance 
(Drucker, 1985). In any team, the depth of specific knowledge builds with 
vintage of the team members, and so board members with longer 
specific board experience should have a deeper understanding of the 
issues and challenges and hence contribute to firm innovation. 
 
1.8.3 (b). Other Board experiences: 
Effective boards are able to develop skills and capabilities which are 
above the base level of expectation. (Klearner, Yoshikawa, & Hitt, 2018). 
Board members from adjacent spaces and/ or from related experiences 
can add valuable perspective both from knowledge base and from their 
experience of understanding the board decision making processes. 
 22 
Hence we postulate that Governance Experience which is  a 
combination of  
a. the depth of current board experience and  
b. the width of understanding of managing board challenges 
across multiple organizations  
should be a key driver of innovation.  
 
 
1.8.4 The Demographic Composition Effect   
  
1.8.4 (a) Gender 
Going beyond the agency theory and the resource based theory view 
about the role of the board , there is developing view around the ability 
of the board to provide advice and counsel to the CEO and the TMT (van 
der Walt & Ingley, 2003). This advice and counsel is largely based on 
the different perspectives that the different members of the board bring 
to the table, which is supposedly going beyond the direct skill and 
resource based view about the capabilities of the board and its individual 
members. Men and women have differences with respect to their ethical 
behaviours (Kray, Reb, & Galinsky, 2004). There is difference in terms 
of corporate social view between the different genders (Bear, Rahman, 
& Post, 2010). Women provide a broader view to any problem and 
gender therefore has a significant support in theoretical basis for 




1.8.4 (b)  Age 
The concept of age and its role in teams and boards has not received 
much attention though there are some attempts in literature that examine 
the effect of age.  Younger board members  are generally associated 
with higher energy and enthusiasm and openness to risk and change  
(Ararat, Aksu, & Cetin, 2015), and provide a vastly different perspective 
from established team members and hence they help in fostering 
innovation. 
 
At the same time , age and gender are generally considered to be 
amongst the most easily observable personal criteria.  Most social 
psychology academic research postulates that people in general tend to 
form first impressions about other people and do tend to categorize them 
on the basis of generally observable physical characteristics like gender, 
age etc. (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). It is also seen that such categorization 
is generally consistent, and moreover is able to sustain itself in spite of 
interventions that are introduced to reduce social categorizations 
(Hewstone, Hantzi, & Johnston, 1991). Surface level demographic 
observations clearly lead to categorization (Bell, Villado, & Lukasik, 
2010). Clearly such categorization based on age and gender could also 
lead to board inefficiencies and hence impact its decisions related to firm 
innovation. 
 
We therefore postulate that the “Demographic composition” – driven 
by generally observable factors like age and gender should have a 
 24 
significant relationship with the ability of the organization to drive 
innovation. 
 
1.9 The contingency perspective: Interaction of diversity with board 
size 
 
Structural contingency thinking posits that suitability of any structure 
depends upon the situational /environmental factors (Zona, Zattoni, & 
Minichilli, 2013) (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Hence, while there is no perfect 
or best way to organize, it is many times the contextual factors which 
end up being the key determining factors in understanding the 
effectiveness of the structure in question (Birkinshaw, Nobel, & 
Ridderstale, 2002). Research on the board of directors indicates that, 
the Contingency perspective is the right approach to analyse board 
effectiveness as there are many key factors impacting board 
composition, characteristics and interactions . (Boyd, Haynes, & Zona, 
2011). Each board member brings to the table a certain “unique” set of 
knowledge, skills, experiences , capabilities, networks, information, and 
individual set of beliefs, values, attitudes. The board works as a team 
where these individual factors determine the thought process of the 
member as an individual and the board also operates as a strategic team 
wherein multiple individuals and group interactions occur which have a 
strong bearing on the overall outcome of the decisions of the board.  
The board composition reflects the critical board diversities and these 
have a strong interplay within the context of the board size. The size 
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of the board has a strong influence on the capabilities, knowledge and 
resource pool that is available. The size of the board of directors  also 
has significant effect on how the group dynamics change the group 
cohesion and impact group decisions, because any group decision is 
finally a compromise on the different views of group members (Sah & 
Stiglitz, 1986) (Sah & Stiglitz, 1991). The size of the Board of directors 
is a thereby a key determinant of corporate performance and innovation 
as the board size determines the board operating frameworks and also 
provides context for the behaviour of board members which shape the 
decision making of the board.  
 
Some academic literature supports the view that large size board is more 
effective due to improved monitoring capability because larger boards 
have ability to create work teams that can provide more focus (Anderson 
& Tushman, 2004). This is supposed to be more so in case of more 
complex firms (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008), as the monitoring task 
is even more difficult in such firms. Members of larger boards tend to feel 
that their perceived risk of a decision is lower and that allows them to 
calibrate more aggressively for investment and innovation decisions 
(Damanpour, 2010). Large boards have better information processing 
capabilities in comparison to small boards (Haleblian & Finklestein, 
2017) (Haleblian & Finklestein, 1993). In addition, larger size of the 
board can also help the company to forge external connections with its 
market and its competitive and regulatory environment thereby 
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enhancing the firms’ ability to make strategic competitive analysis and 
improve the quality of its innovative decisions.  
 
At the same time , it has also been shown that large size of the board is 
likely to create more challenges in the level of communication (Cheng, 
2008) and this can also affect exchange of information with the 
management, thus impacting quality of decision making (Zahra , 
Neubaum, & Huse, 2000). Smaller boards are able to reduce the 
opportunity of managerial opportunism because they have stronger 
cohesion and hence control over CEO and management. (Yermack, 
1996). In addition, the size of the board also has a motivational impact 
on each board member as some members feel less important in large 
boards. (Zona , Zattoni, & Minichilli, 2013), (Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 
1979). Large boards also provide many board members the ability to 
enjoy the ability to “free ride” and enjoy social loafing (Lipton & Lorsch, 
1992) and enjoy the benefits of reduced participation efforts.  
 
Therefore  the size of the board impacts  innovation due to its effect on 
the information capability of the board, the governance modality of the 
board , the perspectives of the board, the individual motivations of the 
board members  and the dynamic capabilities of the board .Hence, the 
board size should become a significant contingency factor for analysis 
as to how it has a moderating role in shaping the effects of board 
diversity in determining  the innovation outcome of  the firm. 
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1.10 Dimensions of our study  
 
The core of our analysis is the research question exploring “What 
is the effect of the different constituents of diversity of the board of 
directors on the innovation of the firm? What is the nature of these 
relationships?. 
 
a. The primary interest of our investigation was hence to understand the 
extent to which diversity of such experiential merit variables ( 
information, dynamic capabilities and governance) and diversity of 
representation ( demographic) variables are related to firm innovation. 
 
b. Secondly , within the context of the conceptualization of these specific 
experiential variables, we also investigated the moderators of the 
relationship of these experiential diversities and firm innovation by 
specifically examining the effect of the board size.  
 
c. In addition, previous studies have proposed that there is a possibility 
of significant impact of “ setting of the study”  while executing studies 
that explore composition of teams and team outcomes (Bell S. T., 
Villado, Lukasic, & Belau, 2011; Bell, Villado, & Lukasik, 2010).  We 
thereby, also examine the results in different study settings ( industry 




SECTION 2 : DETAILED THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The theory of innovation, the theory of diversity and homogeneity, the 
theory of corporate governance and the theory of dynamic capabilities 
of a firm  are the primary theories that provide the contextual background 
for this study. In this section we review these diverse theories from a 
prior research and understanding perspective and that helped us to 
identify specific gaps in the existing literature which  then led us to the 
key research question that we address in our thesis paper. 
 
2.1 Diversity 
In the modern world, Diversity is not just relevant in the social and 
political context but it has a cultural, behavioural and economic milieu 
too. As business organizations have grown and become more complex- 
both structurally and environmentally, the diversity in the composition of 
its constituent groups has become of significant importance (Milliken & 
Martins, 1996) (Torchia, Calabro, & Huse, 2011). As people travelled, 
educated, lived and settled across continents and as the economic 
activity of corporations started to traverse national boundaries , the 
emerging MNCs (Multi-National Corporations) also had a MNC (Multi 
National Cultural) effect and it became imperative for corporations to 
understand the effect of organizational and team diversity (Milliken & 
Martins, 1996). Researchers and management practitioners have all 
been deeply interested in understanding the influence of  characteristics 
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of team members on its performance. (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & 
Sanders, 2004). 
Penrose (Penrose, 1959)  was among the earliest academics to address 
the important relationship of the diversity in the workforce with the 
performance of the organization as she highlighted that a firm reflects its 
“unique character” which is dependent upon the heterogeneity of the 
resources that are available to the firm. The Individual and his/ her 
importance as a particular member of a team/ group / is itself a very 
critical input for the success of the outcomes of the group / team. The 
Human Capital Theory (Becker, 1964) highlights the importance of the 
cognitive and productive capabilities of the individual as provided by the 
concerned individual’s education levels, skills and experience. This 
cognitive perspective expounds the necessity of multiple resources to 
create the competitive advantage for firms on a sustainable basis. 
Collectively, the combination of such capabilities and competencies form 
the human social capital of the company (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). 
At the same time, the individual members of a team carry a particular 
perceived status along a multiple set of attributes ( gender, race, 
education, family background etc.) as per the Status Characteristic 
theory . This status has a significant bearing on the group interactions / 
group dynamics and these different  standards possibly help create 




2.2 The double sword effect of heterogeneity 
While there is large amount of research reflecting  that the demographic 
differences among the team members have a relationship with team 
performance, it is not conclusive as to what the nature of that relationship 
is and this relationship could be both positive or negative, (Tsui & Gutek) 
(van Kippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). 
 
2.2 (a) The Positive Effect of diversity in a team: The Cognitive 
Resource Perspective: 
The cognitive resource perspective  is largely based on the concept of 
knowledge and postulates that the “differences in the distribution of 
demographic factors is a reflection of the wider knowledge base and 
allows for availability of broader and different perspectives, and hence 
improves the team performance”  (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998), (Cox & 
Blake, 1991). When there are different views causing disagreements 
with respect to opportunities and/ or threats facing an organization, the 
strategic decision making groups (comprising of upper echelon group 
members as individuals and as a group) thereby are aware of more 
issues, more ways of looking at the issue and can explore more 
alternative action steps  (Bantel & Jackson, 1989) (Wiersema & Bantel, 
1992). Ethnically heterogenous groups produce better ideas (McLeod & 
Lobel, 1992). Disagreements thereby allow improved learning 
opportunities for the group (board) and reduce the probability of group 
think. (Lant, Milliken , & Batra, 1992).  Research also indicates that 
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diverse views and disagreements also force the upper echelon group , 
namely the board to spend firm resources to getting more information, 
specialist analysis etc. and that improves the board’s 
comprehensiveness and extensiveness of analysis (Miller, Burke, & 
Glick, 1998). A team that is composed of members who provide a more 
diverse and hence unique demographic distribution is likely to be more 
successful than a homogenous team because the diverse team has 
access to a resource pool that has a broader base of information and 
knowledge and a wider base of available perspectives of different types 
(Bell, Villado, Lukasic, & Belau, 2011) . Board members who like each 
other tend to increase board “cohesion” ( liking and sticking up for each 
other) (OReilly III, Caldwell , & Barnett, 1989). Based on the concept of 
inferred evaluation, individual board members tend to think that 
agreement on an issue reflects liking of the person ( and not just the 
view). Cohesion therefore tends to reduce the comprehensive and 
extensiveness of analysis as ideas and issues go unchallenged, and 
diversity and disagreement on the board therefore improves quality of 
analysis and innovation by reducing ‘cohesion” (Miller, Burke, & Glick, 
1998).  
 
2.2 (b) The Negative Effect of diversity:  
While academic research provides strong support to the cognitive 
perspective, there are also a few academic arguments that suggest the 
opposite relationship.  
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The Co-operation Perspective – There are multiple theories that 
postulate that increase in intra-group diversity leads to reduced 
performance because coordination and cooperation among group 
members is reduced and hence the group work is no longer synergistic 
and positive (Milliken & Martins, 1996). 
Communication failure – Because of diversity of cognitive thought or due 
of diversity driven by backgrounds, individuals end up using means of 
communication whether in terms of language, image, body language, 
mannerism, etc.  which have different meaning for different individuals 
and this creates communication challenges (Daft & Lengel, 1986), and 
impact board and firm strategic analysis and innovation. 
The Social Identity/ Categorization Theory  (Tajfel, 1981) (Tajfel, 1978), 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1985) explores the inter personal interactions based on 
principle of attraction-selection-attrition amongst people, wherein 
individuals are believed to seek out and group-in  with “similar” 
(homophilic) members. This further impacts the manner and the extent 
of exchange and communication within the group. Diversity among a 
group / team leads team members to categorize “other” members into 
clusters / sub-groups, leading to creation of “in-group” or “out-group” 
biases. Furthermore, members in a diverse team tend to make certain 
assumptions about the social status of other members, largely based on 
visible / demographic characteristics and hence their engagement with 
other members is driven by their “expectation” of the assumption based 
status/ position. The Expectation model hence further leads to a 
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negative effect on team performance (Bell, Villado, Lukasic, & Belau, 
2011). 
The Similarity Attraction Paradigm postulates that members with similar 
demographic/ sociographic similarities have a natural mutual attraction 
with each other because of commonality of their shared attributes 
(Byrne, 1971). Given this mutual attraction, the members have respect 
of others’ views ( in group), are able to communicate better with each 
other and work more cohesively and hence homogenous groups have a 
better performance than heterogenous teams (Wiersema & Bantel, 
1992). 
 
2.3 Different conceptualizations of diversity 
The diversity of a group can therefore be viewed in multiple ways and 
has multiple definitions, and thereby there are various frameworks for  
defining and conceptualizing group diversity. Harrison and Klien, in their 
highly regarded study in 2007 have focused on developing a clear 
definition of diversity and a strong framework for diversity constituents 
wherein they define diversity as “a unit level compositional 
construct”, which basically describes “the distribution of differences 
among the members of a unit with respect to a common attribute” 
(Harrison & Klein, 2007). 
 
The key facet of the nature of diversity of a particular unit/group could be 
seen as indicative of the differences in the underlying factor in terms of 
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the nature or substance of the factor, or it could be as a result of the 
range of nature of arrangement  of the differences, or it could arise from  
differences in the engagement and effects arising from different types of 
engagement of the underlying facets. These can be operationalised in 
terms of categories as defined by Harrison and Klein as: 
a. Separation 
This refers to the differences amongst the team constituents with respect 
to their values, opinions, beliefs, attitudes in terms of lateral differences 
on a continuum scale (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Among two teams A & 
B, wherein A has all members with attribute X and B has all members 
with attribute Y, the two teams will effectively have the same level of 
homogeneity because there is no “separation” amongst its members 
with respect to the particular attribute . Therefore the social theories of 
group and team interaction based on similarity attraction, social 
categorization etc. tend to look at diversity as a values/ beliefs / opinions 





The variety construct refers to the differences with respect to categories 
among the members of the team. The diversity is contributed by the 
different categories i.e. number of different categories. (Harrison & Klein, 
2007) The variety construct associates closely with the Cognitive 
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Resource Perspective. Highers number of categories (higher variety) 
driving higher diversity in team improves availability of information pools  
and knowledge resources and  this difference in information, experience 
and knowledge of members contributes to higher & broader level of 
perspectives, better discussion/ debate/ analysis of the tasks and  
challenges/ opportunities and hence increased level of team 
performance (Bell, Villado, Lukasic, & Belau, 2011). We derived almost 
all of our operational diversity constructs on this principle. 
 
c. Disparity 
The construct of disparity refers to the differences in resource 
concentration amongst members. (Harrison & Klein, 2007). The 
diversity construct has its essence in the “inequality” levels amongst the 
team constituents with respect to availability of resources /special 
privileges. (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Unlike the separation construct, the 
Disparity construct reflects the differences among team constituents on 
a vertical scale of high and low resource availability (unlike “Separation” 
which has a lateral disposition with opposite values/beliefs etc.). 
Therefore, in developing any understanding of the diversity , it becomes 
imperative to look at each element of diversity as a description of specific 
pattern of effects arising out of individual element or a combination of 
Separation, Variety or Disparity . For any particular diversity construct 
one could view the impact arising out of a different perspective of the 
construct itself. We could  consider a construct as providing variety, 
because  it contributes to providing a higher availability of perspectives 
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and a higher availability of relevant information, which based on the 
cognitive resource theory lead such diversity construct to contributing 
positively to the performance of the team (Harrison & Klein, 2007). At 
the same time if we conceptualize the same diversity variable as a 
separation construct, then it could lead to creation of groups/sub groups 
( based on similarity attraction theory) , create group alignments and 
biases( social identity theory) and bring about a reduced  level of 
cohesion in the team dynamics, poor team execution and overall 
reduced team performance (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Therefore it is 
important to have a clear understanding of the underlying diversity 
construct in developing the theoretical model of diversity and its 
relationship with innovation.  
We have taken support of this seminal  conceptualization by Harrison 
and Klein’s to specifically define the relevant construct for each of our 
diversity elements while postulating our hypothesis.  
 
 
2.4  The Resource Based View and the Dynamic Capability View: 
 
The view of a firm that went beyond looking at it as an administrative unit 
and brought to fore the perspective that the firm could derive value from 
its resources was highlighted by Penrose (Penrose, 1959). Rubin 
(Rubin, 1973) then added the perspective that a firm uses the resources 
in different combinations for certain activities. Identification and 
deployment of critical resources by the firm can become a critical driver 
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of the firm’s capability of generating superior performance (Wernerfelt, 
1984). This set the ground for the emerging resource based view 
wherein it was the ability of the firm to identify, procure, utilize the 
relevant and critical resources that would drive its competitive 
advantage. (Porter, 1985) (Barney J. , 1991) (Wernerfelt, 1984). It was 
important for the firm to thereby focus on the knowledge, skills and 
technologies that it used and the routines that reflect the behaviour 
patterns of the deployment and the usage of the resources (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990) (Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
 
According to this RBV view, a firm that has access to resources that are 
classified as valuable, rare, inimitable and non- substitutable (VRIN 
resources), can achieve SCA ( sustainable competitive advantage 
through its innovative and value creating strategies (Barney J. , 1991), 
(Nelson R. , 1991), (Conner & Prahalad, 1997). Firms are always trying 
to understand their operating conditions and look for opportunities within 
their environment, so that they can innovate and are able to frame new 
value and gain competitive advantage (Porter, 1985) (Porter M. , 1996) 
(Damanpour & Schneider, 2009). 
 
The extension of the RBV to take it beyond its static view of the resource 
capabilities was enumerated in the Dynamic capability view where in it 
is believed that it is the ability of the firm to “integrate, build and 
reconfigure internal and external competencies/capabilities “ that allow 
the firm to successfully innovate and address the rapidly changing 
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environment. (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Dynamic capabilities of 
the firm are therefore seen as the organizational routines which allow 
the leaders and managers of the firm to be able to combine and integrate 
resources, shed or acquire resources with the objective to create value 
for the firm (Grant, 1996) (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Dynamic 
capabilities are  “organizational routines” – i.e. a set of processes that 
“use, integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources depending upon 
the needs of the environment or for the needs that may cause a change 
in the environment (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) (Bresnik & Hisrich, 
2014). The dynamic capabilities are also seen as “change oriented 
capabilities for reallocation / redeployment of firm’s resources (Zahra & 
George, 2002). The dynamic capabilities can be therefore looked at as 
a combination of  
i) strategic processes as well as  
ii) operational processes.  
 
In the dynamic operating environment, the strategic processes and 
routines are largely focused around  
a) “sensing” i.e. identifying the opportunities  and  
b) “seizing” i.e. deciding to act upon the opportunities, and the 
operational processes focus on re-calibrating and “Reconfiguring” the 
firm resources to achieve the desired objectives for the opportunities that 




2.4.1 Dynamic capabilities, Organizational learning and innovation 
 
Innovation has been considered both as an outcome and as a process. 
It can be considered as an outcome or a result of responding to 
deepening or emerging competition, that may necessitate changes in 
products, services or business models. It can also be seen as a process 
that involves many activities i.e. improving existing products and 
services, and responding to dynamic changes in the environment etc. 
Innovation is achieved as a result of the learning process wherein 
knowledge is acquired, shared, developed and transformed (Huber, 
1991). Therefore organizational learning is an antecedent of firm 
innovation (Jiminez-Jiminez & Sanz-Valle, 2011) (Bresnik & Hisrich, 
2014). The dynamic capabilities of the firm help to create a culture and 
environment that is positively oriented towards knowledge and increase 
organizational learning. (Jurksiene & Giniuniene, 2015). It has been 
established that for firms to be able to achieve innovation, they need to 






































Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997): “We define dynamic capabilities as the firm’s 
ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to 
address rapidly changing environments. Dynamic capabilities thus reflect an 
organization’s ability to achieve new and innovative forms of competitive 
advantage given path dependencies and market positions.” (Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, Dynamic capabilities and strategic management, 1997) 
 
 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000): “Dynamic capabilities include well-known 
organizational and strategic processes like alliancing and product development 
whose strategic value lies in their ability to manipulate resources into value-
creating strategies. Although idiosyncratic, they exhibit commonalities or ‘best 
practice’ across firms….They evolve via well-known learning mechanisms.” 




The innovation literature offers multiple perspectives on the subject and 
the different conceptualizations of innovation define it in both generic 
and specific manner. Innovation “means different things to different 
people” (King, 2000). Innovation strategies are generally defined as the 
corporate strategies that help the firm create new strategic opportunities 
(Miller & Trianna, 2009). Innovation is now widely accepted to be a key 
strategy for any firm in its quest to gain sustainable competitive 
advantage (Hitt M. A., Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996). It is not 
only considered important for competitive advantage but is also seen as 
vital for improving the overall firm performance ( (Moreby, 1988). It is 
also well established in academic literature that innovation level in an 
organization can be a key predictor of future performance (Hitt M. A., 
Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996).   
As innovation is the key antecedent to the firm’s success (Covin & 
Slevin, 1991), the study of the antecedents of firm innovation allows 
researchers to further explore the critical conditions that are necessary 
in driving organizational success (Zona, Zattoni, & Minichilli, 2013). In  
modern and large organizations, the real benefits of strategies and 
executions that drive innovation are only realizable over an extended 
period of time and hence such strategies need to be designed for a long 
term (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982) (Lee & O'Neill, 2003). However, with all 
this focus there is yet to be complete agreement on developing a 
common and accepted definition of innovation (Bantel & Jackson, 1989).  
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Conceptually, innovation has been described by (Kimberley, 1981) as 
either  
a. an overall attribute of the firm, or  
b. simply as a process or  
c. as a set of discrete items.  
 
In management strategy literature, disruption is considered as a key 
component of the innovation cycle. Disruption is “an interruption to the 
well-established processes and practices which are then dismantled / 
destroyed / redesigned  in order to make way for innovation” 
(Schumpeter, 1962). The concept of disruptive innovation, which today 
has become one of the most researched areas of management study 
can be traced back  to the seminal work of Abernathy and Clark 1985 
(Abernathy & Clark, 1985) (Wan , Williamson, & Yin, 2015) who had 
postulated the idea that disruptive innovations had a negative effect on 
the value of existing businesses and technologies. 
Christensen , in his seminal book “ The Innovators Dilemma”  then 
articulated the modern understanding of disruptive innovation where he 
defines it as technologies “that provide value from sources that are 
different from the standard /mainstream technologies” (Christensen C. , 
1997). Such disruptive technologies are initially considered supposedly 
inferior to the well-established technologies, especially on parameters 
which are of critical importance for the current primary customers. 
Therefore, the new technology is purportedly having significance and 
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relevance only for a small “niche” segment of the market. However over 
a period of time, with the customers reflecting the new shifts in need, 
and with the availability of technology driven enhancements, the markets 
go through disruptive change (Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 2015). 
Christensen and Raynor then expanded the term “disruptive 
technologies” to “disruptive innovation” by extending the concept beyond 
manufacturing (products) to services and to business model changes 
and innovations (Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 2015). It is now 
believed that it is not necessary for a business to undergo a technology 
change or functionality change for disruptive innovation and that any 
change which can challenge the existing “value proposition” is 
considered disruptive innovative change (Markides, 2006). 
There is also a notable amount of research that focuses on the enablers 
of organizational innovation.  The Resource dependence view of 
innovation elaborates on the proposition that the availability and 
allocation of an organization’s resources is a critical input for the 
organization’s ability to innovate (Wan , Williamson, & Yin, 2015). The 
Board of directors is by itself a key source of direct resources and also 
through its network a key provider of intellectual, financial and regulatory 
resources for the large firms. The board of directors which is effectively 
a decision making body (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) (Zona , Zattoni, & 
Minichilli, 2013), through its decision making efforts can definitely effect 
corporate innovation by being able to set the overarching context under 
which the firm executives operate and pursuit innovation (Stiles, 2001).  
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2.6 Board of Directors & Corporate Governance 
There have been a large number of studies that have attempted to 
examine the impact of the demographic composition of TMT ( top 
management team) on organizational performance. Drawing largely 
from strategic management literature, the focus is on the Upper Echelon 
Theory, which postulates that it is the structure, composition and 
compilation (diversity) of the Upper echelons (TMT) of any organization 
that performs a critical and important role in the strategy formulation , 
the strategy implementation  and hence in the performance of the 
organization (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990), (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
 
The Board of Directors’ role is broadly defined with responsibilities to 
manage and oversee a firm’s activities which allow it to set a strategic 
vision, framework & direction for the enterprise, ensure the monitoring & 
supervising of the firm and its management, and develop a strong 
governance structure to ensure that the organization’s objectives are 
being effectively achieved while protecting the interests of all relevant 
stakeholders of the enterprise. In essence, the Board of Directors’ key 
responsibility is to optimize the performance of the enterprise as per the 
directives and desires of the owners of the firm (Bainbridge, 2002). 
 
2.7 Board Governance and its complexity  
Academic literature review on corporate governance  does tend to have 
consonance on the view that the Board of Directors play a critical, 
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significant and complex role (Torchia, Calabro, & Morner, 2015). 
Governance research has over the years been quite extensive and has 
employed both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Qualitative 
researchers have identified , a set of  key variables (Boone, Casares, 
Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007). Different researchers have analysed multiple 
aspects of the board, in terms of the board structure, the board 
composition, the board interactions, the board responsibilities  and the 
board behaviour,  and have found that governance is a highly complex 
and a very dynamic phenomenon (Sargot & Rita, 2011).  
 
The core of modern governance is built around the stakeholder theory , 
wherein the key stakeholders in any firm/ organization were seen to be 
“ any group or individuals who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984). 
Freeman postulated the term stakeholder as a broad categorical group. 
This included management, shareholders, employees, consumers, 
external suppliers/creditors, regulators, etc. (Freeman, 1984). The 
stakeholder and the upper echelon perspective are driven on the central 
thought that the “cognitive differences” among the members of this 
stakeholder group/ upper echelons affect the strategic decisions.   
 
At the board, the governance role is largely focused around the three  
key roles and tasks of the board namely : 
a. Resource provision  (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000), 
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b. Monitoring Management (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990) and 
c. Advisory (Andrews, 1971). 
2.7.1 Resource Dependency 
Viewed from the lens of  resource dependence, a firm, in order to 
survive, tends to acquire and exchange resources wherein it creates a 
dependency with these resource providers, and hence it is critical for the 
firm to build linkages that promote the creation of such resource pools 
(Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). This theory argues that the leadership 
(which could be both the TMT or the board of directors of the company) 
through its linkages is able to  
a. provide the firm with resources of information, knowledge, 
skills, external connections and communication channels, and  
b. provide its insights and counsel which help the company/ firm 
to survive and succeed (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978).  
In the context of board composition, the resource dependency construct 
builds the argument that  the members of the board of the company / 
firm should be individuals who have the capability to provide such range 
(width and depth) of resources that include functional / geographic 
knowledge, expertise in financing and other critical expertise, legitimacy 
and reputation which all put together provide the Human Capital and also 
provide the Relational Capital ( through network ties with appropriate 
stakeholders ) (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
2.7.2 The Agency Theory / Approach 
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However, corporate governance also relies on the Agency theory which 
revolves around the conflict in the relationship between the Principal ( 
Shareholder/Owner) and the Agent of the Principal ( Executive 
Management), focusing on the inherent issues of differing interests and 
conflicting alignments between the principal and the agents (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). The Board of directors is assumed to be the independent 
arbitrator of protecting the interests of the principal ( i.e. shareholders), 
and hence securing the long term survival of the firm by ensuring that 
through effective monitoring and control the conflicts are minimized and 
managed (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009) (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The 
board is hence focused on controlling and managing issues arising out 
management opportunism (Huse & Zattoni, 2008).  
2.7.3 The Strategy / Advisory view: 
The managerial hegemony theories and the strategic view theories 
prescribe to the board a largely advisory oriented role where the board 
is focused more on giving strategic inputs but is not directly engaged in 
monitoring, controlling, directing the management performance 
(Andrews, 1971).  
2.7.4 The moral and social view of the board responsibility 
The moral perspective of the board responsibility is architected in the 
idea that the board has social responsibility and carries certain moral 
obligations under its stewardship role (Van der Welt & Ingley, 2003). The 
board is expected to govern not just for shareholder maximization but 
also expected to undertake ethical and moral responsibility for all 
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stakeholders (Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, Corporate Governance, 
1997). The board of the firm is therefore supposed to represent the social 
balances (Carver, 2002). This ultimately underpins the representative 
view for diversity in the board. 
2.7.5 Management and Customer Relationships 
Large firms also face the challenges of perpetuity management wherein 
the management of the firms get bonded to large customers ( especially 
those that provide perpetuity of revenues and enjoy relationship vintage) 
because the management is “vested” in such relationships as they 
determine firm performance especially in the short term. In such a 
scenario, the management provides overdue weightage to feedback and 
needs of the existing customers and tends to overlook / avoid need for 
change and innovation. (Christensen C. , 2006). 
 
2.8 Decision Making:  
The board at the end of the day is a decision making body. Decision-
making as a process has two core elements – Decision and Behaviour  
(Oliveira, 2007). The Rational ( normative ) decision making process 
focuses on identifying a set of potential alternatives that would allow us 
to reach a solution to the problem (Goodwin & Wright), (Hoch, 
Kunreuther, & Gunther). The rational model of decision making is based 
upon getting information from various sources and then analysing the 
potential possible alternative solutions and then making an informed 
choice (Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther).  
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On the other hand, the Descriptive (Psychological) decision making 
processes rely upon the cognitive process of understanding and upon 
the basic principles that are utilized to make the decision, by processing 
information through a set of simplifying mechanisms and filters based 
upon contextual experiences (Oliveira, 2007). Decision making is 
effectively a process of responding to the various types of stimulus from 
the external world and the society at large and therefore it is important 
to understand the role of beliefs, values etc. and their relationship with 
cultural / social aspects of decision making (Oliveira, 2007). It is hence 
imperative to understand the theoretical processes of decision making 
to be able to architect the processes that are involved in the relationship 
and contextual environment of board diversity and firm innovation. 
 
2.9 Diversity , Decision Making, Governance , Innovation and the 
Dynamic Capability at the Board – The interrelationship and our 
study objectives 
From the above we clearly see that existing academic literature on the 
relationship between board diversity and innovation is related to a 
multitude of conceptual theories around decision making, resource-
based and dynamic capability-based firm strategies, social interactions, 
governance  and heterogeneity. Resource based theories suggest that 
bringing together diverse stake holders allows the firm to acquire critical 
resources ( (Pfeffer, 1972) (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). The 
Dynamic capability theories suggest that it is not just the static resources 
but the dynamic capability of the firm ( and its strategic decision makers) 
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that drives innovation and competitive advantage. Heterogeneity 
research suggests that more diverse groups consider a broader range 
of perspectives and drive creativity and innovation ( (Hoffman & Maier, 
1961) (Wagner, Pfeffer, & O'Reilly ,III, 1984). Clearly, there is a strong 
relationship between a firms’ diversity and its knowledge base and 
hence with its innovation and creativity capabilities (Ostergaard, 
Timmermans, & Kristinsson, 2011). Agency theory proposes that the 
board’s role is to do a collective monitoring of management / CEO 
(Garrat, 1997).  Heterogeneity of views amongst board members would 
result in a reduction in idiosyncratic decisions by the board and would 
lead to a higher level of scrutiny within the board (Bernile, Bhagwat, & 
Yonker, 2018) and this would result in higher innovation by the firm. At 
the same time, while  there have been many studies that also show that 
heterogenous groups lead to a reduction in the cohesion and the 
integration of the group (Wagner, Pfeffer, & O'Reilly ,III, 1984). With a 
high level of diversity at the board, the decision making process would 
be disrupted, a higher level of conflicts will occur, communication will be 
impacted and these issues will increase the difficulty for the board to 
attain and maintain consensus (Arrow, 1951) and this would clearly lead 
to reduced innovation by the firm. 
 
Hence , given the multiplicity of factors involved and the multitude of  
theoretical constructs that provide a different theoretical basis for the 
relationships between each factor and firm innovation, this research was 
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focused on determining the nature of the relationship between the 























SECTION 3: THE STUDY CONSTRUCTS, DEFINITIONS AND 
HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1 Our diversity constructs as “Variety” 
As we have seen earlier, the seminal effort of Harrison and Klein 
enumerated the criticality of developing a clear view of diversity along 
separation, variety or disparity. It is critical that the each 
conceptualization of diversity should be matched with the specific 
operationalization mechanism (Harrison & Klein, 2007).  
 
Our constructs of demographic, dynamic capability, information and 
governance diversity at the board of large organizations reflect the 
differences i.e. variances between the board members, primarily in 
terms of information, knowledge or experience.  We believe that the most 
significant aspect of the heterogeneity in a group is not driven by the 
polarity and the degree of polarity of the views ( i.e. separation). The 
decisions that board members take are largely not bi-polar in nature, and 
the impact of the decisions of the board of directors is also not generally 
bi-polar. We also believe that at the level of the board of directors, 
diversity effects are not primarily reflected through the eminence of 
power distance between members ( disparity) because the board 
members are almost always individuals with distinguished track records 
and high levels of achievement, and so the concept of superiority-
inferiority is not very prevalent. The difference of expertise and 
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experience/ backgrounds/ knowledge rather tends to reflect in mutual 
respect. 
Hence in our definition of the various diversity constructs, we chose to 
focus on “variety” as the driver of diversity at the board level. This aspect 
allows us to view distribution of diversity almost as a “uniform 
distribution” and not as a continuum, thereby reflecting an almost even 
spread of constituents across different categories when the diversity is 
at the maximum (Harrison & Klein, 2007). We believe that within the unit, 
i.e. the board of directors, each board member differs from the other 
board member on the specific diversity attribute that we have defined. 
We therefore developed our theoretical constructs by defining diversity 
as “a variety in the composition of the board of directors”, in line with 
some of the recent research on board of directors. (Galia, Zenou, & 
Ingham, 2015). 
 
The key associative aspect of diversity as a variety is the change in the 
cognitive capability and the impact on the behavioural aspects of the 
board. So when boards have all members belong to the same category 
of the concerned attribute, the variety is minimum and so the board does 
not add any incremental information, knowledge or capability by adding 
another member of the same category or replacing one member with 
another of the same category (Shannon, 1948) (Harrison & Klein, 2007). 
At the same time if each board member represents a “unique” or different 
category, the distribution and hence the diversity of the attribute is the 
maximum possible.  The underpinning of conceptualizing diversity as a 
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“variety” for board of directors is also supported by the cybernetic 
principles that teams have the capability to utilize a higher level/quality 
of information to make better decisions (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990) 
(Harrison & Klein, 2007). As the “variety” of  board members increases, 
each board member is effectively getting differentiated more and more 
from each other because they each represent a different category and 
thereby reflect a different position of thought, experience and 
perspective. 
 
3.2 The Individual diversity constructs 
 
3.2.1 Demographic Diversity 
 
We define board demographic diversity as a combination of the diversity 
of gender and diversity of age composition of the board members. We 
look at demographic diversity as a “variety” construct based on the 
conceptual belief that women and men, and the young and the old, have 
qualitative differences in their knowledge and information pool and that 
these differences can be categorized (Wood, 1987). 
 
3.2.1 (a) Demographic diversity and Innovation 
 
The Resource based view of board governance postulates that 
Demography based differences in views, in perspective and in styles of 
different board members will foster a higher level of creativity among the 
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board members leading to improved innovation for the organization. 
Women contribute to the boards by providing a different set of 
perspectives and styles of working compared to the male board 
members (Daily & Dalton, 2003). The age diversity on the board allows 
a board to examine issues from perspectives of different age groups 
which fosters improved learning for the board and a more effective 
analysis of the strategic elements of the business leading to improved 
creativity. (Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007) (Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & 
Hanuman, 2012). 
  
Demographic Diversity therefore leads to a differentiated level of 
information amongst different members leading to higher cognitive 
capabilities of the board which as a consequence help improve the 
process of 
a) choice evaluation ,  
b) the opportunity and threat analysis and  
c) resource allocation  in board decision making, 
leading to higher innovation for the organization. The diverse board 
demography in terms of gender and age also allows the board to have 
different viewpoints on certain issues given that demographic 
differences driven by gender and age lead to variance in thought 
process, attitudes  and belief systems. This helps to thereby improve the 
process of decision making at the board level especially related to 
strategy, competition and resource allocation.  For example, women and 
younger board members are generally more sensitive when the issues 
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in front of the board of directors relate to the environment (Post, 
Rahman, & McQuillen, 2015) (Hafsi & Turgut, 2013) or are issues related 
to values and ethics  (Selby, 2000) and (Hafsi & Turgut, 2013).  
 
However there is strong support in academic research that demographic 
differences of gender and age lead to early stage crystallization of 
personal and group/sub group identities. The formation of such groups 
leads to inter group disassociation and intra group association, which in 
a board creates strong prejudices amongst group members and such 
prejudices lead to reducing the board ideation capability and the quality 
of analysis. In such situations, board members tend to associate with 
and support  intra group analysis and reject inter group ideation leading 
to a drop in the effectiveness of decision making and innovation. The 
social identity theories do suggest that gender based approach could 
lead to “sorting and psychological belonging” (Kanter, 1977) (Pelled, 
1996), which at the board level leads to increasing conflict and reduces 
board decision effectiveness and hence impacts the organizational 
innovation. The majority gender in the board ( generally males) tend to 
perceive that the female board representation is a reflection of 
affirmative action and not justified on merit and this causes male cohort 
formation which has a poor view of other gender ideation and inputs. 
This also leads to female gender dissatisfaction which causes reduced 
group association and increases suppression of voice. Similarly age 
heterogeneity leads to formation of age cohorts which contribute to 
formation of inter group biases and even temporal caps at the board. 
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This has a significant impact on the quality of board processes and board 
cohesion and reduces overall innovation at the firm. 
 
We are arguing that demographic diversity has a curvilinear 
relationship with innovation . When the demographic diversity is low, 
the board  tends to take a benign view of the inputs of the minority 
demographic members. This allows for a positive and nurturing 
operating environment, where multiple perspectives are shared, 
discussed and hence organization is able to derive the positive benefit 
on innovation. In a board where the demographic diversity is relatively 
low, it is highly likely that it is being nurtured by the Chairman/CEO as a 
quasi- affirmative action and the differing view from women / younger 
members are encouraged by the leadership which allow them to 
question status quo scenarios and suggest new alternatives as problem 
solutions and effective and efficient implementation. Hence at relatively 
low levels of such diversity, the challenges posed by reduced availability 
of resource based cognitive inputs are overcome by the positive 
operating board environment where low levels of social identity and 
social categorization allow for higher overall innovation for the firm.  
 
When the demographic diversity is moderate in a board of directors 
setting, that the broader issues of social identity and social 
categorization take hold, i.e. the smaller gender & age groups tend to 
have high in-group association and the imbalanced diverse groups tend 
to have strong in-group and out-group biases. Strong power distance 
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issues emerge wherein the minority members need to jostle for space, 
there is distrust among in-group and out-group members and board 
members of gender and age minority need to seek comfort against the 
biased conversations and discussions which tend to reduce the overall 
cognitive effectiveness of the board and reduce  the creativity and 
innovation of the firm. The minority diversities at moderate level then 
tend to experience lower satisfaction with their role (Ostergaard, 
Timmermans, & Kristinsson, 2011) and demographic diversity then 
tends to cause emotional conflict at the board  (Pelled, 1996) . 
Demographic diversity , especially driven by age/ gender  can also lead 
to differences along not some but across a wide range of issues (Golden 
& Zajac, 2001) (Zajac, Golden, & Shortell, 1991), and this has negative 
consequences for innovation of the firm. 
 
We believe that when the demographic diversity tends to get to a higher 
level, then the board is able to derive strong benefits from the broader 
and wider cognitive information pool of board members who are able to 
look at strategic choice decisions with a broader, deeper and wider  
perspective. In a highly diverse board, the minority/ smaller demographic 
groups (gender and age based) tend to have “representative size”  and 
in the smaller group/ sub groups do not face power distance challenges 
and are able to share perspectives, beliefs on issues facing the firm in 
an open and transparent manner. Clearly , highly diverse boards only 
become such because they have the support of the leadership and the 
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shareholders . This leads to overall confident sub groups, with improved 
problem assessment and opportunity analysis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a curvilinear relationship between 
demographic diversity of the board and the firm’s innovation and 
this should be reflected in a U shaped relationship. 
 
3.2.2  Dynamic Capability Diversity: 
 
Extant literature on diversity suggests that dynamic capabilities are a key 
driver of firm innovation (Zollo & Winter, 2002) and its competitive edge. 
In the volatile and fast changing environment, the dynamic capability 
view was therefore seen to extend the RBV( resource based view) and 
views the dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s potential to systematically 
solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and 
threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its 
resource base (Barreto, 2010). Dynamic capabilities of the firm are 
therefore seen as the organizational routines which allow the leaders 
and managers of the firm to be able to combine and integrate resources, 
shed or acquire resources with the objective to create value for the firm. 
(Grant, 1996) (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) . It has been established 
that for firms to be able to achieve breakthrough innovation, they need 
to focus on the development of the firm’s dynamic capabilities 
(Michailova & Zhan, 2015).   
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We extend the concept of the dynamic capabilities of the firm to the 
board of directors of the firm. The Upper echelon research postulates 
that organizational outcomes reflect the “values and the cognitive bases 
of the powerful actors in the organization (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
The board of directors has typically a strong decision making role and 
can affect organizational outcomes.  Senior leadership of a firm also face 
the challenges of information overload, unclear and ambiguous 
information inputs, time constraints and prioritization and allocation 
challenges , the decisions that they make are therefore driven by their 
personalities (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004) and by their 
experiences. Therefore we postulate that it is the dynamic capability 
experiences of the board that reflect their abilities to sense and  seize 
the opportunities and then and reallocate and transform the 
organizational capabilities and resources to drive firm innovation.  
 
3.2.2 (a) Dynamic capability experiences and positive association 
with  innovation. 
 
It has been asserted in academic literature, most notably by (Miles & 
Snow, 1978) in the adaptive innovation theory , that organizations that 
are oriented to innovation need to focus on finding the solution to three 
key managerial problems- the entrepreneurial problem, the engineering 
problem and the administrative problem. The entrepreneurial problem is 
solved by focusing on new business ideas, new business segments and 
new products. The administrative problem is solved by having leadership 
 61 
capability to manage risk and uncertainty and to be able to manage 
organization structure to execute. The engineering problem is solved by 
focusing on developing the highest levels of knowledge and 
understanding and through a highly analytical approach built on 
meticulous , methodological and systematic approach.  
 
Hence  we consider Entrepreneurial Experience of founding and building 
a firm, Leadership experience of being CEO/Chairman of a firm, and 
Research experience from an academic doctoral program as key 
Dynamic capability experiences, i.e. experiences which are vital 
resources for a board and that such experiences drive the firm dynamic 
capability which has a significant relationship with firm innovation.  
 
Leadership experience: Leaders ( i.e. board members with prior 
leadership experiences as CEO/Chairman) enhance the firm dynamic 
capability by providing the ability to integrate firm’s disparate resources. 
Such board members because of their prior experience will also provide 
the board and hence the firm strategic and analytical decision making 
dynamic capability. In addition, having prior experiences as leaders 
allows the board members to provide the firm with improved resource 
allocation and alliance making/ acquisition oriented dynamic capabilities 
too.  Boards with leaders, will provide the capability to solve the 
administrative problem as identified by Miles and Snow, and support 
disruptive thinking environment which promotes innovation (Miles & 
Snow, 1978). Leadership experience thereby  would enhance the firm 
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dynamic experiences and provide  stronger support to innovation 
routines in the firm. 
 
Every social exchange has an underlying background which is based on 
the cognitive aspects which is related to the shared mental models and 
shared narrative that exists around the exchange participants and the 
ecosystem (Arrow, 1951) (Arrow, 1970), (Orr, 1974). Board members 
who identify themselves with a CEO role (current or previous), feel 
higher trust with the CEO and the TMT because they relate to the 
narratives, the scenarios that the CEO/TMT provide to the board 
(Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008). Increase in this trust level 
leads to improvement in the quality of the advice from the board member 
and also increases the risk calibration of board decisions and hence 
nurtures a positive association with innovation. 
 
 
Research experience: Board members with research oriented 
qualification such as PhD/ Doctoral Studies, will enhance the overall 
competency matrix of board skills and board dynamic capability  that 
would normally help in executing the governance function (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001)( (Ujunwa, 2012) (Boyd B. K., 1995).  Such board 
members will enhance the knowledge creation routines and build the 
thinking capability within the firm.  Research & Development activities of 
the firms have a well stablished relationship with innovation. “Research 
and development has a positive correlation with all measures of 
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innovation output” (Mairesee & Mohnen, 2004). R&D has been seen to 
be clearly useful not only for development of new products and new 
processes but also helps in supporting a firms’ ability to maintain and to 
improve on its competencies, especially in terms of business intelligence 
(Karlsson & Olsson, 1998). Moreover, the mere fact that the firm has 
R&D activities, nurtures an organizational climate that fosters 
questioning and critical analysis and enhances the organizational 
capability to orient and adapt to change (Freel, 2000).  The ability to 
create such a climate of appreciating and imbibing knowledge is a critical 
knowledge routine and an important dynamic capability for the 
organization. In addition, the cumulative knowledge accretion from 
historical R&D activities over a period of time helps nurture innovation in 
the firm (Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1996). The ability of the board to review 
and assess R&D activities of a firm improves with board members who 
have Doctoral degrees (Dalziel, Gentry, & Bowerman, 2010). 
 
Entrepreneurship experience:  Having entrepreneurs on the board of 
directors allows businesses to think beyond their existing customers and 
current products and provide support to ideas that nurture innovation in 
the firm (Yu & Hang, 2010). Entrepreneurs contribute positively to the 
board and firm dynamic capabilities by helping the formation of routines 
that improve resource allocation, risk-opportunity assessment and 
alliance building as these are key components of an entrepreneurial 
process. Entrepreneurs know how to make difficult but necessary 
pivoting decisions and have the necessary skills to make the complex 
exit decisions relating to products, segments, partners, vendors, and 
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processes etc. and therefore presence of entrepreneurs on the board 
enhances the firm overall dynamic capability.  
 
Board members with founder experience will have a strong relationship 
with idea generation, idea modulation and idea execution processes, all 
of which are key to the Innovation Process. Start-up businesses are 
generally accepted to be more effective in producing disruptive 
innovation. (Wan , Williamson, & Yin, 2015). “It is the entrepreneurs who 
experiment and are able to develop and adopt innovations” (Yoav & 
Schori-Bachrach, 1973).  
 
Hence, exposure to such “Dynamic capability experiences” will have a 
strong relationship with questioning, ideation, review and execution 
processes, all of which are key to Innovation. These experiences 
significantly impact the capability to think differently and disruptively, 
and, reflect critical analytical thinking which all together lead to higher 
creativity and superior analysis, improve resource allocation and more 
effective decision making, all of which are critical to drive Innovation. 
Therefore, the number of directors with Dynamic capability experiences 










3.2.2 (b) Dynamic capability experiences and negative association 
with innovation 
 
Behavioural decision theory indicates that “managerial hubris” creates 
cognitive bias due to which the decision maker tends to “overestimate” 
their personal capabilities and skills to solve the problems (Camerer & 
Lovallo, 1999). This management overconfidence also leads to 
underestimation of risk and business uncertainty (Shane & Stuart, 2002), 
(Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). As a combination of these effects, hubris 
leads to a negative impact on organizations’ ability to make appropriate 
decisions, solve problems, and hence impacts its ability to drive 
innovation.  Presence of multiple directors with current and/or prior  
leadership experience leads to enhancement of the cognitive bias due 
to the potential hubris issue and this has a detrimental impact on 
organization’s innovation performance.  There is also support from both 
the agency theory and the stewardship theory to the view that directors 
who exhibit strong CEO identity (because of their current CEO role with 
another firm) tend to reflect a high level of empathy with the CEO 
(Finklestein & Hambrick, 1989), and they tend to reflect a lower level of 
monitoring (Zajac & Westphal, 1995), and are more amenable to 
managerial discretion (Stiles, 2001). The board members then develop 
some sort of hesitancy and reluctance to have a critical view of the 
management (Lawler , 1990), (Mace, 1971) which reduces the board 
oversight quality and lowers the level of examination and inquiry leading 
to reduced innovation.  
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Specialists with academic research orientation tend to succumb to “early 
group” formation which causes teams and boards to suffer from out-
group bias and out group derision and reduce debate and points of view 
in an analysis. 
  
Entrepreneurs tend to underestimate the risk and it has been seen in 
studies that over-optimistic entrepreneurs are more likely to be 
associated with negative firm performance (Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006) (Li 
& Tanh, 2010). In addition, entrepreneurs in a group suffer from early-
norm issues and reflect out-group derision especially with professional 
career executives.  
 
We also understand from past research that when such Dynamic 
capability experiences are present  in a group, the overall cohesion of 
the group is not very effective. This lack of cohesion within the group 
when seen at the board level impacts the board decision making on 
issues of understanding of problems, identification of risk, analysis of 
solutions and organizational resource allocations which all impact firm 
innovation. All these tend to reduce the innovation driving benefit of 
diversity of Dynamic capability experiences.   
 
3.2.2.1.Possible relationships between interaction effects of 
Dynamic capability diversity and Innovation: 
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3.2.2.1 a  When the dynamic capability diversity of the board is low, the 
cohesion/ communication  challenge is low, and the uniqueness of 
Dynamic capability  experiences is respected, views are nurtured 
thereby providing support for innovation. As the dynamic capability 
diversity of the board tends to reach moderate levels, the cohesion 
challenge becomes significant, the team dynamics and group formation 
reduce the quality of analysis and debate. Group formation tends to 
happen with board members (who have similarities of clearly 
distinguishing experiences like research or corporate leadership or 
founding businesses) starting to coalesce together and the members 
with non-dynamic capability  experience forming their own groups. This 
leads to problems of “unshared information” (Stasser G., Vaughan, & 
Stewart, 2000). The board governance processes get challenged, in a 
manner that the benefits of firm’s dynamic capabilities, diverse thinking 
and wider cognitive capabilities are matched off with the board cohesion 
issues and the firm innovation is not able to derive the complete benefit 
of the wide resource of experiences in its decision-making process. As 
the dynamic capability diversity of the board increases to higher levels, 
the resource pool of experiences significantly improves the absorptive 
capacity of the firm and the cognitive benefits will drive strong innovation. 
When the dynamic capability , has maximum variety, board members 
would be seeing each other as “almost everyone being different from 
everyone else” and hence respect each-others’ views and observations 
(Vermeulen, 2013). They will also not have high association/ 
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categorization  with each other and this will also lead to lower groupism 
and bias.   
Therefore, we propose that Dynamic capability diversity in a board has 
a curvilinear relationship with Innovation. 
 
Hypothesis 2(a): There is a curvilinear relationship between 
Dynamic capability diversity of the board and the firm’s innovation, 
and this should be reflected in a U-shaped relationship. 
 
3.2.2.1b . Given the multiple levels of interactions possible between the 
resource-based view, the agency view, the dynamic capability view , the 
stewardship view of the nature of governance role of the board members 
and the multiple implications of the identity and social identity theories 
impacting the board processes, there is theoretical support for the 
alternate hypothesis too.  When a board has low levels of dynamic 
capability diversity, the overall cognitive strength of the board is low, the 
firm’s standard capabilities are nurtured but the board is unable to 
provide experiential inputs or establish higher level routines that would 
help it analyse the management inputs regarding entrepreneurial, 
administrative and process problems, thereby impacting the quality of 
analysis. The board then is also unable to provide direct solutions, and 
is unable to sense or seize the opportunities before it  thereby reducing 
creativity and innovative opportunities for the firm. As the board of a firm 
improves the dynamic capability diversity of its board members, it 
improves the routines regarding sensing and seizing opportunities and 
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the higher level capabilities to reconfigure firm resources through 
analytical decision routines and hence the firm should see a positive 
curve for innovation. However, as the organizational governance 
theories have suggested, while such cognitive benefit starts to accrue, 
but high levels of heterogeneity on dynamic capability experiences 
amongst the board also leads to group formation, fosters inter-group and 
intra-group biases, and impacts the quality of enquiry at the board. This 
negatively impacts the firm’s capability to get the best analysis of the 
challenges and the solutions presented by the management and leads 
to inefficient resource allocations and thereby brings a negative slope 
effect on innovation.  
Hypothesis 2(b): There is a curvilinear relationship between 
Dynamic capability diversity of the board and firm innovation, and 
this should be reflected in an inverse-U shaped relationship. 
 
 
3.2.3 Information Diversity 
As per the theoretical literature on role and responsibilities of the board, 
one of the key activities is allocation of resources and making investment 
decisions on behalf of the shareholders of the firm with the objective to 
maintaining sustainable competitive advantage. The board effectively 
acts upon the management inputs as a filtering mechanism, and it 
reviews the information provided by the management by interpreting that 
data based upon their cognitive capability. Therefore, the educational 
qualifications attained by the board members are of vital importance and 
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are seen as a precedent to the cognitive value and the human capital of 
the board (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) (Dallenbach, McCarthy, & 
Schoenecker, 1999). 
 
Higher education not only provides deeper information but also tends to 
build a more “receptive attitude” towards innovation, because higher 
education helps to improve “paradigmatic perspectives” and helps to 
manage complex situations (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Moesel, 1993). 
Higher educational qualifications have a strong relationship with 
cognitive ability and the level of education has been seen to have a 
positive relationship with the openness and commitment to innovation 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
   
In addition to the highest qualification, we strongly express the view that 
exposure to multiple educational institutions, is a way of providing a 
broader perspective of values and beliefs. This multiple institutional 
experience also provides a wider exposure to differing methodologies of 
analysis. It is well established that each institution has its own 
institutional logic and that exposure to each such institution logic allows 
the person to internalize it, not just as entity schemas like people, places 
etc., but also as event schemas like implicit theories (Glaser, Fast, & 
Harmon, 2016). The  individual then develops a cognitive frame based 
on such associative network of schemas, to determine his/ her decisions 
and actions in different contextual situations (Glaser, Fast, & Harmon, 
2016). Alma matter congruence thereby brings about a reduction in 
overall cognitive quality of the board. In addition, the  alma mater 
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similarity led attraction causes cliques & groups to form. This then  
introduces biases in the group analyses, reduces the efficacy of  group 
participation and increases intra-group derision , which all contribute to 
negative impact on innovation. 
 
Similarly, exposure to large networks in industry and socio-economic 
environment adds to the absorptive capacity, (Zahra & Pearce, 1989)) 
(Hitt M. , Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996). Each member of the 
Board of directors has his/ her own external network and that contributes 
to the information pool of the individual and hence the board. The 
Resource based view considers this resourcing ability as a strong 
determinant of the information and cognitive capability of the board 
which allows it to effectively analyse strategic problems and identify 
solutions, thereby increasing organizations’ chances to innovate.   
 
Information diversity of the board (which we define as a combination of 
higher education diversity, educational institute diversity and network 
diversity) therefore like most other diversities has dual effect on the 
innovation.   
 
Hence we posit that when Information diversity in a board tends to 
increase, the board will start to derive strong benefits in innovation from 
its improved resource pool of cognitive information but at some stage 
the cognitive overload will lead to scenarios where the board tend to lose 
focus on key issue. It will also lead to increase in group biases which 
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cause delays in quality and timeliness of analysis, reduces 
communication and negatively impact cohesion in execution which will 
all together then lead to reduced firm innovation. Moreover, the negative 
relationship of high information diversity with firm and team performance 
which has a lot of theoretical support for team dynamics is even more 
relevant in a setting like the board of directors of a firm, as they make 
complex investment and prioritization decisions, within a limited time 
frame (as boards meet less frequently and operate with tight schedules 
for their meetings). 
 
H3: There is a curvilinear relationship between Information 
Diversity of the board and the firm’s innovation and this should be 
reflected in an inverse U shaped relationship. 
 
3.2.4 Governance Experience Diversity  
The tenure i.e. the time period of association (of key decision makers) 
with the firm affects the strategic decisions made by the firm (Hoskisson, 
Hitt, Johnson, & Moesel, 1993). Research has shown that the monitoring 
role of a board member as per the agency theory improves with a deeper 
understanding of the situation, as it improves the cognitive knowledge of 
the group/ board. Also, the wider is the experience of board members 
across other boards, the larger is the network of connections, which 
provides the opportunity for higher absorptive capacity for the firm and 
improve firm innovation. Similarly, deeper and wider understanding and 
experience of board dynamics allows for more effective cohesion of 
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decision making at the board and hence drive innovation in an effective 
manner. 
At the same time research also indicates that higher vintage in the 
organization’s board leads to entrenchment , conformity and inertia in 
thinking (Vance, 1983) which lead to  reduced risk taking in terms of 
allocation of resources  for challenging ideas and projects. Generally 
such boards will respond to challenges with traditional patterns of action 
and ideation (Kiesler & Sproul, 1982) and lead to reduced innovation. 
Entrenchment in a board and presence in multiple boards also leads to 
“prestige association” , perceived seniority which through power 
distance causes suppression of voice in the group and reduces the level 
of debate and scrutiny thereby having a negative impact on 
organizational innovation. 
In our view , the Governance Experience diversity (BED) of a board ( 
defined as a combination of diversity of current board vintage and 
diversity of other board experiences) has a combined effect of the 
cognitive benefits and entrenchment/ conformity challenges. We 
consider Governance experience diversity as a variety construct  as the 
board is thereby composed of members who have effectively belong to 
different cohorts and bring a different set of experiences to the table 
(Anacona & Caldwell, 1992). At low levels of GED, the overall cohesion 
in the board is high, allowing for quick and efficient decision-making at 
the board and there is board support for views of smaller minority/ 
different voice groups,  leading to high innovation. But at moderate levels 
of GED, the board entrenchment issues start to effect the decision 
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making quality and the bureaucratic board processes and group biases 
have a negative effect on firm’s ability to innovate. However when we 
have larger levels of GED, the board allegiances are difficult to maintain 
(Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Moesel, 1993), the benefits of higher 
absorptive capacity and wider information and perspective (Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992) will lead to high level of  innovative decision making. 
 
H4: There is a curvilinear relationship between governance 




3.3 The Moderating effect of Board size:  
 
A review of extant literature on board governance suggests that the size 
of board is viewed by many researchers from a resource dependency 
perspective (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978) in terms of the fact that boards 
are able to provide access to resources that are vital  for the success of 
the firm. Large boards are expected to have higher cognitive levels from 
their within-board membership access to large pool of information (Burt, 
1997). They also have  larger interlocking ties which allow for improved 
resource pool and hence improved absorptive capacity of the 
organization. Larger boards are also expected to have a higher 
competency range. These cognitive advantage allow larger boards to 
have a sharper analysis of the situation, a higher level of debate and 
 75 
improved problem analysis and solution orientation which should all 
promote innovation. 
 
From an agency perspective, larger boards are expected to have a more 
effective command over the  senior management leadership of the firm 
because larger boards are able to establish more structured board- 
management review processes through specialized committees, and 
can distribute oversight responsibilities more efficiently( (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989), (Hitt M. , Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996). This 
allows boards to undertake complex decisions of innovation like R&D, 
capital allocation and risk etc. more efficiently. (Wincent, Anokhin, & 
Boter, 2009). Large boards also have the ability to create stronger 
confidence in the management (which feel more comfortable working 
with structured boards than with direct relationships) and this promotes 
TMT’s ability to undertake risky innovative strategies. In addition, larger 
boards lead to reduced perceived risk for an individual board member 
due to decision-diffusion and this builds board confidence in taking 
longer term and higher uncertainty/ higher volatility decisions.  
 
Simultaneously, we also come across a body of research that suggests 
a negative impacting relationship between board size and organization 
performance and organizational innovation. Larger networks have worse 
control outcomes (Human & Provan, 1997). Large boards have difficulty 
to maintain strategic focus, and are unable to have sustained active and 
participative discussions , given that boards normally meet sporadically 
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and have high levels of time constraints. Larger boards have a challenge 
in terms of factions, groups and coalitions that form based on social 
identity and social integration phenomenon (OReilly III, Caldwell , & 
Barnett, 1989). Board decisions in large boards then tend to be taken on 
the basis of inter-group compromise rather than of transparent dialogue, 
efficient and effective cognitive analysis, and that tends to reduce firm 
innovation. In large boards there is a challenge of board member 
motivation because the impact of individual contribution is not perceived 
by the board member to be high , which leads to ideation restriction, 
reduced participation and social loafing , thereby reducing board 
effectiveness on complex decisions driving innovation (Latane, Williams, 
& Harkins, 1979). Large boards also are exposed to the challenges of 
communication and coordination which create issues of cohesion and 
reduce comprehensive decision quality (Hackman & Morris, 1975). It is 
difficult to build and maintain trust in large teams  (Burt, 1997), which 
along with the challenge of in group- out group formation in large groups 
tends to reduce risk taking ( which is key for innovation) because larger 
groups have a tendency to reject risk (Cheng, 2008). Smaller boards are 
more effective and faster in decision making which is key advantage 
when speed to market is key and hence smaller sized boards can be 
more effective in driving innovation.  
 
We suggest that the relationships between the board diversity elements 
and innovation as stated in hypothesis 1-4, do not render a complete 
view on an independent basis and that the size of the board has a key 
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moderating role on the strength of the diversity relationships with firm 
innovation and that the effect of board size interaction with each diversity 
construct ( i.e. demographic, dynamic capability, information or 
governance)  is different given the multiple interlinkages of the 
interacting dimensions that are involved. 
 
3.3 (a) Demographic diversity and Board size 
In small boards the cognitive benefit  from multiple perspectives of 
demographic diversity will not be leveraged as smaller boards members 
have a high perceived risk on an individual basis , which reduces 
analysis, investment and support for innovative projects and R&D in 
firms. Small boards generally tend to avoid risk, focus less  on long  term 
investments and longer payoff decisions . Smaller boards also tend to 
see themselves from an agency perspective and assume the role of risk 
managers holding shareholder responsibility and when demographic 
diversity of gender and age is increasing in smaller boards, the risk 
avoidance approach of diverse board members moderates negatively 
the effect of multiple perspectives that the board should have been able 
to operate with. Hence the higher demographic diversity is not able to 
drive stronger innovation outcomes in smaller boards.  As the board size 
becomes large, the individual perceived board member risk orientation 
is reduced,  the larger boards are more structured in terms of 
management supervision processes and therefore the significant 
cognitive resource augmentation with increased demographic diversity 
 78 
has a stronger positive impact on debate, analysis, choice and hence 
creativity and innovation. 
 
H5: Board size will moderate the curvilinear relationship between 
Demographic diversity and innovation such that the relationship 
will be stronger in larger boards. 
 
3.3 (b) Information experience diversity and board size 
 
Larger boards have higher probability of group formation while in small 
boards board members feel confident to engage on an individual basis 
and they do not feel the need to protect themselves from “others” by 
joining certain “in groups”. Therefore the large boards have very strong 
in-group / out-group bias which tends to overshadow the, multi-
institution, higher education and network driven advantage of broader 
perspective and cognitive strength which drives innovation. When we 
have large boards with high diversity driving multiple such views, 
cohesion becomes a significant challenge and the board effectiveness 
falls. Therefore we believe that the curvilinear relationship between 
information diversity and innovation is stronger for smaller boards and 
less reflective in larger boards. 
 
H6: Board size will moderate the curvilinear relationship between 
Information experience diversity and innovation such that the 
relationship will be stronger in smaller boards. 
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3.3 (c) Dynamic capability diversity and Board size: 
 
In small boards the cognitive benefit of Dynamic capability experiences 
will not be leveraged as smaller boards have perceived personal 
association challenges for board members for high risk innovation and 
R&D type decisions. Small boards generally tend to avoid risk, focus 
more on short term decisions. Smaller boards also tend to see 
themselves from an agency perspective and assume the role of risk 
managers holding shareholder responsibility and hence the higher 
Dynamic capability diversity is not able to drive stronger innovation 
outcomes in smaller boards.  As the board size becomes large, the board 
members are less risk oriented and their personal perceived risk 
association goes down, the boards are more structured in terms of TMT 
supervision processes and therefore the significant cognitive resource 
augmentation with increased dynamic capability diversity is able to 
manifest more effectively. The challenge of coordination and cohesion 
problems will also get mitigated in large boards since larger boards will 
have more well defined and structured processes.  
 
H7: Board size will moderate the curvilinear relationship between 
Dynamic capability diversity and innovation such that the 




3.3 (d) Governance experience diversity and board size 
In small boards the challenges of entrenchment, status-quo, comfort and 
risk avoidance are very strong, given the smaller number of board 
members. Hence the firm is unable to draw benefits of improving 
governance expertise because the small boards are generally more 
execution focused, have stronger communication and therefore there is 
not significant leverage of the cognitive strength of network and 
perspectives which is derived from such diversity. However when the 
board is large, the effect of governance diversity gets amplified because 
in large boards the network benefit of size is more effective, and the 
structured approach of large board processes leverages on the cognitive 
strength derived from governance experience diversity and this 
structured approach overcomes the issues of communication, improves 
risk taking capacity of board members and hence promotes overall firm 
innovation. 
H8: Board size will moderate the curvilinear relationship between 
Governance Experience diversity and innovation such that the 









SECTION 4 :THE THEORETICAL  MODEL  
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SECTION 5 : DATA SOURCES   
 
In our research, we used the following different sources of data.  
5.1 Innovation Data: Forbes WMI  
The Innovation outcome of the organization will be defined as the 
Innovation Premium that has been developed by ForbesTM, for each 
organization as a part of its annual World’s Most InnovativeTM (WMI) 
companies list. The Forbes WMI list is a reliable, established industry 
standard and a consistent index listing the world’s top 100 most 
innovative companies for almost a decade. Each company in the Forbes 
WMI List is ranked based on the calculation of the Innovation Premium 
(detailed in section on Variables). The innovation premium is calculated 
by making future projections of a firm’s cash flow and its income and the 
model then derives a future NPV, based on business anticipated growth 
rates. This value when compared with market value gives a premium/ 
discount value which is  called the Innovation Premium. (Dyer & 
Gregersen, 2018). 
5.2 Board Diversity Data: Boardex 
 
 
To identify the different measures of diversity of the members of the 
board of directors, we have collected data of the various characteristics 
of members of the board of directors of 209 companies spanning across 
702 company years from BoardexTM. We have embellished the data 
where required (missing from BoardexTM) from manual efforts through 
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annual reports, Orbis, Bloomberg and Reuters. For the list of 
companies in our reference point we have taken the historical revenue 
data from Orbis. 
 
We have used the Boardex data on  excel spreadsheet for the following  
a. Data for European exchange 
b. Data for North America exchange 
c. Data for rest of the world 
 
For each of the geographies, we have the following data files – 
a. Board Summary 
b. Committee Details 
c. Director Profile- Characteristics 
d. Director Profile- Employment  Current Board 
e. Director profile- current Non Board 
f. Director Profile- Employment History Board 
g. Director profile – Employment history- Non Board 
h. Director profile- Others 











5.3 Data Fields: 
 
We have collected the following fields of data from the above-mentioned 
files of BoardexTM, which will be utilized to derive the relevant measures 
of diversity (as explained later) for each board member: 
 
a. Age of Board Member 
b. Gender of Board Member 
c. Director type- ED/SD/ID (Executive Director, Standard 
director, Independent director) 
d. Time in Role in Organization 
e. Time on Board  
f. Total no of Quoted Boards to date 
g. Total no of other boards to date 
h. Total no of Other Boards- Current 
i. Average years on other Quoted Boards 
j. Total Directors on Board 
k. No of Independent NED on board 
l. CEO Duality 
m. Qualification Degree 1- Qualification Degree 6 
n. Different educational institutions of undergraduate or higher 
study  
o. Different roles in current organization 
p. Different roles in other organizations 
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We have also used data from ORBIS and Capital IQ to supplement the 
corporate financial and executive information wherever the core data 
sources needed further information.  Orbis is one of the world’s most 
powerful corporate databases, holding information on more than 365 
million companies and is provided by Bureau Van Dijk, a Moody’s 
analytics company.  Capital IQ is also a world leader in corporate 
information databases, ( Winner of the best data analytics provider – 
Waters Ranking 2019) and is a part of S&P Global Market intelligence. 
We have also update the information wherever possible and necessary 

















SECTION 6:  THE VARIABLES 
 




While innovation has been quite a widely studied topic among 
researchers in different forms of academic research- social sciences, 
governance, policy, management strategy, one of the biggest challenges 
that has been faced by academics and researchers has been the 
inherent subjective nature of the concept of innovation and hence the 
inability to measure innovation with a high level of accuracy and strong 
levels of confidence. Given that the definition of innovation has seen 
wide interpretation, it is not strange that the measurement of innovation 
also has seen may different approaches with no real consensus  and 
hence multiple proxies have been used across different research fields 
(Jensen & Webster, 2009). 
 
The major proxies that have been used are : 
 
a. R&D Expenditure: In academic literature, one common way of 
measuring innovation is based on the “investment” view of 
innovation. The R&D view is based on the concept that 
“innovation in a firm has a connection with the expense that the 
firm makes in developing new products, processes or services, 
with a supposition that this investment will yield positive results 
over time” (Webster, 1999) (Brown, Fazzari, & Petersen, 2009). 
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With this definition, the most appropriate way for us to measure 
the investment metric would be to find the specific investment in 
innovation related to products, services and processes, but it is 
extremely difficult to do so given the intangible nature and lack of 
consistency in defining these items. In addition, there are no 
standardized guidelines in the financial regulatory environment 
for the corporate world to track and report these in their financial 
reports. Therefore, academic researchers have done the logical 
adjustment and accepted the most relevant proxy – the R&D 
expenditure of the firm and have used R&D investments as an 
“indicator of firm’s ability, capability and  propensity to innovate” 
(Qian & Li, 2003); (Wolff & Pett, 2006) . 
 
b. Patents: Innovation has also been closely linked to specifically 
the new product development by the firm and therefore it has 
been strongly believed that any tangible measure which has close 
association with the new product development capability, will be 
a good measure for innovation at the firm. (Jensen & Webster, 
2009). The count of patents and trademarks has also been 
considered in academic literature as a possible measure of firm 
innovation (Greenhalgh & Longland, 2001). While patents can be 
seen as an objective measure of new knowledge but using plain 
patent count does have the limitation of ignoring the weightage of 
the value of the patent given the inability to capture the qualitative 
difference in the output derived from different patents. It is 
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important to note that patent-count should not be confused with 
Trademarks as the latter is not reflective of knowledge, but a 
mechanism that provides protection for words, phrases, images, 
logos, symbols etc.  
 
c. New product launches:  Since innovation is closely linked to 
new products (as was generally defined in the earlier definitions 
of innovation), the new product count has been also considered 
in the past as a measure of innovation (Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 
1996). 
However, many of these methodologies have since lost relevance with 
the modern definition of innovation as espoused by Christensen which 
has looked at innovation beyond just new products and new technology, 
but into business model too.  
 
6.2 The Innovation Premium 
 
It is Christensen’s theory of disruptive innovation, where the core of the 
innovation premium as a viable measure of innovation lies (Christensen 
C. , 1997) (Christensen C. , Raynor, Dyer, & Gregerson, 2012). Change 
through product improvements renders older products obsolete and in 
the same way disruptive innovation renders obsolete the market 
advantage of an incumbent. Therefore it is the market value and market 
premium of a firm that could be seen as a measure of innovation 
 89 
premium. The innovation premium is  based on the core mantra that it is 
the “market” that is most capable to value and judge the firm’s 
innovation. It is the financial and monetary investment methodologies 
that can consistently value a firm, and the capital investment in the 
identified firms reflects what the market believes will be the firms who 
through their innovative strategies will create long term shareholder 
value. (Jensen & Webster, 2009).“The innovation premium of any 
company is thereby defined as the difference between the market 
capitalization of the company and the net present value (NPV) of the 
cash flows of the existing businesses based on the expected growth 
rates in these businesses”. (Christensen, Gregersen, & Dyer, The 
Innovators DNA, 2011).  
  
Forbes prepares the world’s most innovative companies  list in 
partnership with Credit Suisse by calculating the various cash flows of 
the different businesses based on the proprietary algorithm – HOLT TM 
(developed by Credit Suisse). The Forbes method is based on the 
concept of the wisdom of the crowds and conceptually it relies on the 
belief that the global investor community is fundamentally capable of 
identifying firms which they see as innovative today AND they believe 
will be able to continue to remain innovative in the future (Dyer & 
Gregersen, 2018). We have captured data from the WMI list from 2011 
till 2018 giving us a list of 245 * unique companies and 702* company-
year data for our analysis.  When we collated the Boardex data for the 
companies as per the Innovation premium data from Forbes, we had to 
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exclude from the sample certain observations for lack of complete 
information about the individual directors .That finally reduced our 
analysis sample size to 209 companies with 595 company year data 
against 702 company year observations in the Forbes data ( reflecting a 
loss of 15.24%) of possible data observations. The mean observation of 
the Innovation premium is 19.1, with a standard deviation of 12.8 and 
the range of 595 observations is 19.10 - 89.22. 
 
6.2.1 The validation of Innovation Premium:  
 
It is now well-established that over the last decade , there is a high level 
of global acceptability of the Forbes Innovation Premium and Forbes 
Innovation Index as one of the foremost measures of innovation for large 
companies.  This is reflected in its widespread use in the industry as a 
measure of innovation and innovative performance, with firms using this 
index to benchmark their innovative performance.   
 
The innovation premium as a metric of innovation has been further 
analysed by some academics and it was found that the companies on 
the Innovation Premium list generally outperformed the firms that were 
in a control group in terms of measures that define both stock 
performance and market capitalization, over a period of time (Pryzant, 
2014). Innovation premium effectively measures the expectations of the 
market with reference to the company’s capability to innovate in the 
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future and reflects confidence in the “wisdom of the markets” in valuing 
innovation. 
 
The relationship between different proxies of innovation has been looked 
at in some previous studies. Most such research has come to the 
conclusion that there is a high level of variance and that the inter-
relationships between the proxies are inconsistent. The choice of the 
innovation proxy is thereby an important factor for firm level analysis 
(Jensen & Webster, 2009). Notwithstanding the fact that the Innovation 
Premium as a measure has been well established as highlighted earlier 
, we also did a further examination of the relationship between 
Innovation premium and R&D expenditure( the most widely used proxy 
for innovation). 
 
The actual measure used was R&D expense as a percentage of firm 
revenue. We used the data over the same period for the same set of 
firms that have been used for the hypothesis testing. Against a total of 
595 data points ( firm – year information ) , we were able to get data for 
394 data points ( firm year information ) where R&D level information 
was available. This corresponds to a total of 142 companies against the 
original analysis for 209 companies. 
 





Table 1 : Correlation Table – Innovation premium & R&D expense ( as 
percentage of revenue). 
 
       
 
         
        
The Innovation Premium reflects a correlation 0.473, with a very high 
degree of significance ( 2.1619E-23) ( as per the above Table ) . In most 
inter-relations studies, the correlations range between 0.1-0.6 and so our 
result is giving support to the strength of  Innovation premium as a 
measure of the firm innovation.  
 
6.3 The Independent Variables:  
6.3.1 Demographic Diversity (DD): We have defined demographic 
diversity as a combined factor of the constituent factors – Gender 
diversity and Age diversity of the board members. 
6.3.1(a) - Gender Diversity: We collected data on each board member 
for the firms for the board composition that was adjusted by 3 years from 
the year of innovation premium. From the board composition data, we 
classified the gender (Male=1, female=0) and we calculated the Blau’s 
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Index (1- åi2) where i was the proportion of board members who were 
male. This gave us the measure for gender diversity of the board as per 
methodology suggested by (Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & Hanuman, 
2012);(Galia, Zenou, & Ingham, 2015). The calculated scores of Gender 
diversity observations had a mean of 0.225, a standard deviation of 
0.146 and a range of 0.0-0.5. 
 
6.3.1(b) – Age Diversity: based on the same data source as above, we 
also collected the age data for the board members. This was available 
for the respective years for which the innovation premium adjustment by 
three years for the board composition was done. We then classified the 
age on the basis of many previous studies that have used age diversity 
as a measure (Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007); (Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & 
Hanuman, 2012) (Galia, Zenou, & Ingham, 2015) . The classifications 
were 0-<40, 41-<50, 51-<60, 61-<70 and Above 70. We then we 
calculated the Blau’s index (1- åi2), where i = proportion of board 
members in each age category) to derive the Age diversity of the board 
of directors. The calculated scores of Age diversity had a mean of 0.590, 
a standard deviation of 0.125 and a range of 0.0-0.792. 
 
Based on the approach followed by (Chatman & Flynn, 2001), (Randel 
& Jaussi, 2003) and (Wayne & Liden, 1995), we used the amalgamation 
approach to then sum and average these two individual scores for each 
board to create the overall measure of Demographic diversity. This 
approach is supported by the formative indicator argument (Bollen & 
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Lennox, 1991) and hence we have applied it to measure demographic 
diversity. The overall measure of demographic diversity (DD) had a 
mean of 0.407 with a standard deviation of 0.104 and a range of 0.0-
0.631   
 
6.3.2  Information Diversity (ID): We have defined Information diversity 
as a combined factor of the constituent factors –Higher Education 
diversity, Educational institutional diversity and Professional network 
diversity of the board members. 
 
6.3.2 (a) - Higher education Diversity: For each of the board members 
we took from Boardex the respective level of different qualifications of 
each of the board members. Then we classified for each board member 
the highest qualification that he/ she had acquired. We created the 
diversity measure through the Blau’s index by calculating the percentage 
of composition of each board into different categories of highest 
qualification – Doctoral, Post-Graduate/Masters, Undergraduate, No 
degree. (1- åi2), where i = proportion of board members in each highest 
education category). Our observations for higher education diversity had 
a mean of 0.559, with a standard deviation of 0.132 and a range of 0.0-
0.743. 
 
6.3.2 (b) - Educational institutional diversity: We also collected 
information for each director (from Boardex) on the different educational 
institutions that they studied at. We then calculated the number of 
educational overlaps for each director (if the director had one or more 
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overlaps with another) and then classified the for each board the 
percentage of directors who had any overlap with another director, and 
percentage of directors who had no overlap with any director. We then 
calculated the Blau’s Index for educational institutional diversity based 
on (1- åi2), where i = proportion of board members in the overlap 
category. Our observations for educational institutional diversity had a 
mean of 0.334 with a standard deviation of 0.184 and a range of 0.0-0.5. 
 
6.3.2 (c) - Network diversity: We took the number of professional 
networks that each board member has as per the data given in Boardex. 
We then classified the data into the following categories based on the 
number of people in their professional network- 0-100, 101-1000, 1001-
2000, 2001-3000, Above 3000. Then we calculated the Blau’s index for 
network diversity based on (1- åi2), where i = proportion of board 
members in each of the network size category. The network diversity 
observations then had a mean of 0.557 with a standard deviation of 
0.169 and a range between 0.0-0.79 
 
Again, based on the amalgamation approach that has been earlier 
followed by  (Chatman & Flynn, 2001), (Randel & Jaussi, 2003) and 
(Wayne & Liden, 1995), and the support of the causal / formative 
indicator argument (Bollen & Lennox, 1991) we sum and average these 
three individual diversity scores for each board to create the overall 
measure of Information diversity (ID) for the board. The combined 
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variable of Information diversity had a mean of 0.484 with a standard 
deviation of 0.101 and a range between 0.0-0.643 
 
 
6.3.3 Dynamic capability diversity (DCD): We have defined Dynamic 
capability diversity as an average of the constituent factors –
Entrepreneurship experience diversity, Leadership experience diversity 
and Research experience diversity, of the board members. 
 
6.3.3 (a) Entrepreneurship Experience diversity is calculated by the 
measure of proportion of board members on every board who have an 
entrepreneurial experience defined by the following categories- 
Founder, Co-founder, Founding Member, Founding Partner, and 
Founding Director. Then using the Blau’s index (1- åi2), where i = 
proportion of board members within each category – with and without 
founders’ experience) we derived entrepreneurship experience diversity. 
The Entrepreneurial experience diversity observations had a mean of 
0.178 with a standard deviation of 0.168 and a range of 0.0-0.5 
 
6.3.3 (b) Leadership Experience Diversity: We again use the Blau’s 
index to calculate the leadership experience diversity. Leadership 
experience is defined as the experience acquired by having the position 
of CEO and/or Chairman of a firm. We looked at each individual board 
members’ past experience from Boardex and classified them as either 
having or not having leadership experience. We focused on the 
attributes where the ultimate decision-making responsibility and the 
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responsibility for strategy formulation and execution across the firm is 
seen as the critical attribute that allows leaders to develop their decision 
making and disruptive thinking and disruptive analysis skills. The 
categories used for our data were CEO/Deputy CEO/ Regional CEO/ 
MD/ President/ Chairman/ Dy Chairman/ Group General Manager. Then 
using the Blau’s index (1- åi2) where i = proportion of board members 
within each category – with and without leadership experience, we 
derived Leadership experience diversity. The leadership experience 
diversity had a mean of 0.394 with a standard deviation of 0.138 and a 
range between 0.0 and 0.5. 
 
6.3.3 (c) Research Skill Diversity: We developed this measure by 
classifying each board member as having the particular skill of academic 
research which is linked to their having achieved a doctoral degree in 
their educational or work background. As noted earlier, the experience 
of conducting research with academic rigor develops critical analytical 
skills, problem identification and solution orientation skills and theory 
building and logical thinking skills that are critical inputs for disruptive 
thinking. Then using the Blau’s index (1- åi2), where i = proportion of 
board members within each category – with and without academic 
research experience) we derived Research experience diversity. The 
Research skill diversity had a mean of 0.205 with a standard deviation 
of 0.171 and a range between 0.0 and 0.5.  
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Again, based on the amalgamation approach and the support of the 
causal / formative indicator argument we sum and average these three 
individual diversity scores for each board to create the overall measure 
of Dynamic capability diversity (DCD) diversity for the board. The 
combined variable of Dynamic capability diversity had a mean of 0.259 
with a standard deviation of 0.097 and a range between 0.0 and 0.479 
 
6.3.4 Governance Experience Diversity (GED): We have defined 
Governance experience diversity as an average of the constituent 
factors – Current board experience diversity and Other board experience 
diversity of the board members. 
 
6.3.4 (a) Current Board experience Diversity- The experience on the 
current board is measured for each member of the board for every year 
and we then classified them according to the board experience 
categories as per the following distribution: 0-<3 years,3-<6 years, 6-<9 
years, 9<12 years and Above 12 years. This has been used to largely 
reflect number of board terms (since most board memberships are for a 
period of 3 years). Then using the Blau’s index (1- åi2), where i = 
proportion of board members within each category of current board 
vintage experience, we derived Current Board vintage diversity.  The 
board vintage diversity had a mean of 0.613 with a standard deviation of 
0.173 and a range between 0.0 and 0.791. 
 
6.3.4 (b) Other Board experience Diversity – The experience on other 
corporate boards was measured for each member of the board for every 
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year and we then classified them according to the other corporate board 
experience categories as per the following distribution 0-<3 years,3-<6 
years, 6-<9 years, 9<12 years and Above 12 years. This has again been 
used to largely reflect number of board terms (since most board 
memberships are for a period of 3 years).  Then using the Blau’s index 
(1- åi2), where i = proportion of board members within each category of 
other corporate board vintage experience) we derived Other Board 
experience diversity. The other board experience diversity measure had 
a mean of 0.543 with a standard deviation of 0.179 and a range between 
0.0 and 0.792. 
 
Again, as we have done for our other diversity measures, we sum and 
average the two individual diversity scores based on the amalgamation 
approach and the causal / formative indicator argument to create the 
overall measure of Governance Diversity (BED) diversity for the board. 
The combined variable of Governance experience diversity had a mean 
of 0.580 with a standard deviation of 0.129 and a range between 0.0 and 
0.765. 
6.4   The Control Variables 
 
Given the fact that the relationship between board composition and firm 
innovation is multi-dimensional, our intent in this study was to focus only 
on the diversity elements of the board. We have in our study captured 
data on certain other critical variables too because we acknowledge that 
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there are other variables over and above the independent variables that 
we are studying, which have an impact on firm innovation.  
  
6.4 (a) CEO Duality 
Board power structure and Board-TMT interaction has been viewed as 
a key driver of organization decision making, risk assessment, long term 
goal setting and organization investment appetite for R&D and 
innovation investments. The organizations potentially manage the 
agency risk of duality by segregating the task of CEO and Chairman i.e. 
the task of managing decision making and task of managing decision 
control (Boyd 1995). However, at the same time, CEO duality provides 
a management process that provides the clarity in direction because of 
single leadership and improves on the organization’s response to 
external information (Boyd B. , 1995). This improved information 
communication and decision making impact board capability to drive 
innovation. We measured CEO duality through a dummy variable: 0,1( 
for duality not present or for duality present). The variable CEO duality 
had a mean of 0.584 with a standard deviation of 0.493 and a range 
between 0.0 and 1.0. 
 
6.4 (b)  Board Independence 
There is a large body of governance research which reflects the well-
established relationship of board independence and firm performance. 
Independent / Outside members of the board are more effective in TMT 
monitoring, giving a strong support to the agency theory. (Westphal & 
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Zajac, 1997). Also, independent directors add to the external linkages of 
the firm and improve firm absorptive capacity and foster innovation. We 
measured board independence as a ratio of independent directors on 
the board.  The mean of the observations was 0.643 with a standard 
deviation of 0.265 and a minimum – maximum range of 0-1.0. 
 
6.4(c) Firm Size 
 
We also control for firm size, because there is significant extant research 
which postulates that the size of firm has strong bearing on the firm 
innovation . Firm size has generally been accepted to have a positive 
relationship with firm innovation (Cohen, Wesley, Levin, & Mowery, 
1987). Large firms have stronger resource pool in terms of financial 
capabilities, higher risk tolerance, superior employee and technological 
skills, the ability to raise capital and more efficient management 
processes , which all help in managing the innovation cycle more 
effectively (Damanpour, 2010). Another theoretical explanation is that 
large firms generally have to face higher set of competitive challenges, 
increased amount of risk, uncertainty and volatility and this scenario 
necessitates that innovation is critical for large firms to be able to cope 
with such an operating environment. We consider firm revenue ( US $ 





6.4(d) Firm Age 
 
The age of the firm has also been considered in governance research 
as a relevant factor on driving firm performance and innovation. Firms 
that are old are expected to have strong bureaucratic processes and 
generally have higher resistance to change (Zona, Zattoni, & Minichilli, 
2013).They have a longer process to determine the need to change, a 
more bureaucratic process for analysing the potential alternatives and 
then a more complex process for resource allocation, execution and 
monitoring, all of which have a strong negative bearing on firm 
innovation.   
 
Recent research however has also indicated that firms that are well 
established have the benefit of well-established technical capabilities, 
managerial processes, longer standing financial relationships , core 
financial strength and also the ability to assess and manage risk based 
on prior experiences. They also have the capability to assess the risk of 
investments especially those related to innovation because these extend 
over a longer period of time. Hence there is a strong case for a positive 
relationship between firm vintage and firm innovation. We measured firm 
age based on the number of years the firm has been in existence and 
the observations had a mean age of 46.32 years with a standard 




6.5 The “Time-deferred” impact of Board composition on 
Innovation 
 
A key component of the analysis was to define the time-deferred 
relationship of team decisions and the innovation outcomes. Innovation 
is a complex process and decisions that impact innovation need quite a 
bit of time for their implementation to be able to demonstrate their impact 
and reflect in desirable outcomes (Mairesee & Mohnen, 2004). Clearly 
decisions that a board takes generally involve more complexity than 
normal team decisions, and innovation decisions involve higher risk,  
therefore the time frame for consideration has to be beyond the simple 
quarterly cycle of financial reporting and even beyond the annual cycle 
of performance review. Galia et al in their study considered board 
composition of 2006 to have had an impact over the period 2006-2008 
(Galia, Zenou, & Ingham, 2015). In their study of demographic 
diversities, Ostergaard et al , used board composition of 2002 and 
developed their understanding of its relationship with the firm innovation 
probability over the period of 2003-2005 (Ostergaard, Timmermans, & 
Kristinsson, 2011). 
 
We believe that given the nature of our sample firms in terms of scale of 
revenues and size of their operations, and hence the implication on 
complexity of innovation involved, the impact of the decisions by the 
board will take 2-3 years to reflect . A board member has a term of 
generally 3 years and so it is natural that they would like to see the 
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benefits of the decisions reflected during their normal tenure ( unless 
extended). Therefore , in line with the previous studies we have used 
board composition data for a firm on a three year reported difference 










7. OBSERVATIONS & RESULTS 
 
7.1 Descriptive Statistics: Table 2 displays the means, standard 
deviations and the range for the variables in our research. 
 






a. Board Size- The average size of the board of directors was 10.5, 
with the range being a low of 5 to a maximum of 22 and a SD of 
2.7215.  
 
b. Independence- On an average 64% of the directors were 
independent and there were firms which had zero independent 
directors and also firms which had 100 % independent directors 
on their board. The SD of director independence was .265 
 
 106 
c. Revenue- The average revenue of the firm was 11.53 Billion USD 
with a range of 0 and 421.84 Billion US dollars and a SD of 24.501 
Bn USD 
 
d. Vintage- The companies had an average vintage of 46 years with 
a SD of 38.6 years and these firms were as young as 2 years old 
and the oldest being 219 years old. 
e. The Education levels- The data pool has a total of 6258 directors. 
Of these 916 (14.66%) had no formal qualification, 1478(23.61%) 
had undergraduate degree, 2983(47.66%) had a master’s or a 




7.2 The Regression Methodology- Fixed Effects 
 
The analyses was conducted by using the fixed effects regression 
model. The fixed effects regression model allowed us to control for stable 
characteristics and hence was useful in reducing large sources of bias. 
This method allowed us to make comparisons within an entity and then 
across all the entities in the sample, wherein the differences were 
averaged to get the “fixed effects” regression. So when we measured 
our dependent variable y ( innovation premium ), which has a 
relationship with independent variables (x1…xn) over a period of time, 
the fixed effects regression focused on the variation in x over time for 
the same entity and ignored the variation in x between different entities. 
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This gets done because “the between entity variation could possibly be 
contaminated by certain characteristics that are corelated with the 
dependent variable y and this allows us to hence get much more 
unbiased estimates for the regression analysis”. (Allison, 1978). We 
used the panel data for our research , which allowed us  to control for 
certain variables like corporate culture and corporate business practices, 
which vary across companies and might have an impact on innovation. 
We could also control thereby for issues like regulatory policies which 
change over time and impact board decisions concerning innovation. 
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7.3  Observations from Model 1 ( Table 5 ) :  
Model 1 presents the results of the second order relationship between 
the four dependent variables and the independent variable. The model 
1 includes the control variables – CEO duality, Independent Board 
directors , Revenue year and Company vintage. Of these only the 
Revenue(.000089, **) and Company vintage( 0.91 , ***) reflect 
coefficients with significant values. 
 
7.3.1 Observation 1 
 
This model  shows the curvilinear relationship between demographic 
diversity (DD) and Innovation, but the relationship is not reflecting any 





This result is in dissonance with our Hypothesis 1 on effect of 
demographic diversity on innovation and the expectation of a curvilinear 
relationship based on extant theory driven by a combination of resource 
based view and the social identity view. Clearly our results are also not 
showing any significance in a direct effect of demographic diversity on 
firm innovation.  While there have been previous studies that have 
associated gender diversity with improved firm financial/ stock 
performance, our study is highlighting that there is no discernible 
relationship between demographic diversity ( as a combined effect of 
gender and age) and innovation.  The key driver of the theoretical 
positive impact of diversity on demographic factors has been the “ 
visibility” of the difference and the inherent difference in perspective 
between men and women and between the young and the old. The lack 
of significant relationship could be driven by the fact that we are looking 
at a sample of large global firms, where the membership of the board is 
achieved by a select few through a comprehensive and difficult process. 
The women who make it to the board of such firms do not think of 
themselves as “gender’ selection or “regulatory primed” selection. They 
believe that they are there “solely” on merit and on “ equal” basis with 
every other male board member. The engagement of female board 
members is then reflective of the “ reverse bias” i.e. women board 
members  think, behave and engage like a man and that they possibly 
hold back their natural difference in view and perspective so that the rest 
of the board perceives their appointment on “skill and capability” and not 
as “ regulatory/ CSR “ action. This self-restraint then thereby reduces 
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the resource quality as per the Resource based theory. The 
demographic diversity of the board could be seen as a “ proxy for two 
different constructs- experience (from a resource based view) and risk 
aversion ( from an agency view), (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013).  
At the same time , given the quality of the experience of the younger 
and/ or the female members of the board, these members are “unlikely” 
to form cohorts and groups based on visible and discernible differences 
like age and gender , and hence the negative effects of the social identity 
theoretical perspective are also unlikely to be strong in boards. Both 
these views have been supported through the sample of interviews with 
global CEOs and board members ( summary enclosed in Annexure). 
  
Therefore , our observations that reflect a curvilinear relationship 
between demographic diversity and firm innovation but are not seeing 
statistical significance can be possibly looked at in line with some of the 
emerging and recent academic views like (Chapple & Humphrey, 2014) 
where gender heterogeneity at the board is  not seen as having any 
impact on firm innovation (Nielsen & Huse, 2010) also proposed that 








7.3.2  Observation 2 
 
The data reflects that there is a statistically significant curvilinear 








Model 1 gives evidence to a strong U shaped curvilinear relationship  
between Dynamic capability diversity and Innovation premium , thereby 
giving strong support to Hypothesis 2b.  This gives strong support to 
the Dynamic capability view ( DCV) and to the theoretical concept of 
adaptive innovation of Miles and Snow , who identified the need of the 
firm to solve the three key problems- the entrepreneurial problem, the 
engineering problem and the process problem in order to drive 
innovation. The board needs to develop the diversity on experiences 
related to these facets in the form of entrepreneurial experience 
diversity, research experience diversity and leadership experience 
diversity which through a combined perspective of building up firm 
dynamic capabilities diversity clearly reflect a highly significant U shaped 
curvilinear relationship with firm innovation.  The curvilinear relationship 
reflects the need for firms to build a higher level of such diversity to be 
able to get the desired positive outcome differential for firm innovation.  
As we see from the enclosed output chart, as dynamic capability 
diversity increases 0.2 to 0.3 , the firm innovation premium falls by 
0.2799 to its lowest value of 44.1332. However, the rate of increase of 
firm innovation for every increase of 0.1 in dynamic capability diversity 
is highly positive after that – 1.8167 ( from 03.to 04) and 8.106 ( from 0.6 








7.3.3 Observation 3 
 
The data reflects that there is a statistically significant curvilinear 
relationship between Information Diversity (ID) and Innovation – with 
coefficient of -129.4 , a standard error of 56.05 and a p value of 0.021. )  
 
Observation 3 
DCD Premium Std error z P>z 95% conf interval
0.1 46.78938 1.542157 30.34 0 43.76681 _ 49.81195
0.2 44.4131 0.6610178 67.19 0 43.11753 _ 45.70867
0.3 44.1328 0.5378528 82.05 0 43.07911 _ 45.18745
0.4 45.94991 1.39064 33.04 0 43.22432 _ 48.67552
0.5 49.863 3.290199 15.16 0 43.41433 _ 56.31167
0.6 55.87254 6.154239 9.08 0 43.81045 _ 67.93463
0.7 63.97853 9.97853 6.42 0 43.43302 _ 83.52404
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This observation gives support to our hypothesis 3 and as predicted 
reflects an inverse U shaped relationship between the firm innovation 
and information diversity. This gives support to previous research where 
the resource based view propagates a positive effect because with 
higher firm information diversity, the overall cognitive quotient of the 
board improves its capabilities to analyse , review, monitor and make 
resource allocations. The outcome also gives support to the view of the 
social integration theorists that challenges do arise in the quality of the 
board processes, in the engagement of board members, and in the 
power of the inter and intra group biases that take shape when the 
information diversity reaches higher levels . These effects tend to first 
balance out the benefits as we see in the graph and then at some stage 
start to reduce the advantages of multiplicity of thinking.  
 
 
As we notice ( in the table below)  from a zero base to 0.2 level of 
information diversity, the firm innovation goes up by almost 17.87 points. 
However from 0.2 to 0.5 , the innovation tends to stabilize and peak at 
46.4 and at levels of 0.7 tends to fall to 38.106.  This clearly reflects that, 
the multiplicity of information, perspectives and analysis driven by 
diverse views that were contributed by the board members due to their 
Information diversity provides the firm opportunities to create innovation. 
Our results also show that the negative slope effect from social identity 
and group biases is clearly not as strong as the strong and robust 
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7.3.4 Observation 4  
 
This model shows that the curvilinear relationship between Innovation 
and Governance Experience Diversity with IP ( 25.1) , however the 
relationship is not reflecting any significance in testing and hence we 
cannot see support for our hypothesis no 4.  
 
Info Diversity Premium Std error z P>z 95% conf interval
0 20.85879 12.24436 1.7 0.088 -3.139721 _ 44.8573
0.1 31.08911 7.60326 4.09 0.000 16.18699 _ 45.99122
0.2 38.73064 4.105303 9.43 0.000 30.68439 _ 46.77689
0.3 43.78339 1.796192 24.38 0.000 40.26292 _ 47.30386
0.4 46.24735 70.7988064 57.9 0.000 44.68172 _ 47.81299
0.5 46.12254 0.5824032 79.19 0.000 44.98105 _ 47.26402
0.6 43.40893 1.058346 41.02 0.000 41.33461 _ 45.48325






7.4  Model 1 and observations on the control variables  
 
In model 1 ( Table 5 )  we also observe the relationships of the our main 
control variables with the independent variables before we introduce the 
effects of the moderating variable. We see that the sample data reflects 
a strong support to the fact that firm innovation has a positive and highly 
significant  relationship with both firm vintage and with firm revenue ( firm 
size) . These observations are in line with similar studies on board 




7.5   The Observations on the Interaction Effects of Board Size 
  
Models 2-5 are testing the moderating effect of board size on the 
curvilinear relationship between innovation and the different types of 
diversities . In these models we ran the fixed effects regression on our 
panel data by introducing the interaction of board size with our 
independent variables and the second order of the independent 
variables.  In our observations we have taken the approach which was 
used by (Stewart & Barrick, 2000)and by (Hitt M. A., Hoskisson, 
Johnson, & Moesel, 1996) to represent graphically the effects of board 
size on firm innovation – with the graphs reflecting board size in a range 
of minus two times standard deviation from the mean board size  to plus 
two times the standard deviation from the mean board size.  
 
7.5.1 Observation 5 
 
The model 2 tests the moderating effect of board size on the curvilinear 
relationship between demographic diversity and innovation and found no 
significance. The Model 2 regression statistics for the interaction of 
board size with squared value of demographic diversity show the value 
of the coefficient b= 1.855 and but the p value at 0.827 make the 
relationship with the dependent variable not significant and hence do 









7.5.2 Observation 6 
Model 3, tests the moderating effect of board size on the curvilinear 
relationship between Information diversity and innovation and finds the 
effect to be significant. The  interaction of board size with the second 
order of information diversity has a positive coefficient of 46.978 and a p 
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value of 0.002 . This observation provides strong support to our 
Hypothesis 6 that the relationship of information diversity and firm 





Model 3: Graphical description at Mean and at +/-1 Std Deviation 
 
As we observe in the graphs above, the relationship effect of information 
diversity is much stronger when the board size is one or two standard 
deviations smaller than the mean board size in our sample ( 10.5).  At 
the same time , we see that as the board size goes much bigger , i.e. 
one / two standard deviations larger than the mean, the shape of the 
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Information Diversity & Board Size interaction
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that when the board size in the firm is small , the firm generally struggles 
to deliver innovation because the cognitive quotient is on an overall basis 
impacted as its resource pool is small. In such small boards, as soon as 
we can improve the composition to reflect heterogeneity in terms of 
choosing members who are reflecting diversity of information due to their 
educational qualification , information networks and their educational 
institutional variety, the firm sees dramatic improvement in innovation 
outcomes as seen by the steepness of the curve. In large boards, the 
size itself contributes to providing variety of information sources and 
backgrounds ( since the modern firm is no longer a “cookie cutter” club), 
the resource pool augmentation benefit from specifically choosing 
members who provide information diversity tends to get balanced out by 
the challenges of social integration and operational biases in larger 





7.5.3 Observation 7 
 
Model 4 tests the moderating effect of board size on the curvilinear 
relationship between dynamic capability diversity and innovation and 
finds the effect to be significant. The  interaction of board size with the 
second order of dynamic capability diversity has a positive coefficient of 
40.823 and a p value of 0.014 . This observation provides strong 
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support to our Hypothesis 7 that the relationship of dynamic capability 





Model 4: Graphical description at Mean and at +/-1  Std Deviation 
 
As we observe in the figure above, for smaller boards , the relationship 
of innovation and dynamic capability diversity is almost flat and for large 
board sizes ( as seen for one SD and 2 SD away from the mean board 
size) , the U shaped curvilinear effect is well established.  Larger boards 
are less risk averse and less agency-oriented than small boards where 
the personal risk perception of board members is high and that leads to 
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lower level of participation. Also most modern large boards are able to 
overcome challenges of coordination with well-organized committee 
structures which reduce the negative effects of social integration. 
 
7.5.4 Observation 8 
 
The model 5 tests the moderating effect of board size on the curvilinear 
relationship between governance experience diversity and innovation 
and finds the effect to be significant.  The  interaction of board size with 
the second order of governance diversity has a positive coefficient of 
15.086 and a p value of 0.047. This observation provides support to 
our Hypothesis 8 that the relationship of dynamic capability diversity 

















7.6 SUMMARY TABLE OF HYPOTHESIS VALIDATION 
 Hypothesis Outcome 
1 There is a curvilinear relationship between 
demographic diversity of the board and the 
firm’s innovation and this should be reflected 
in a U shaped relationship 
Not Supported 
2 There is a curvilinear relationship between 
Dynamic capability diversity of the board and 
the firm’s innovation, and this should be 
reflected in a U-shaped relationship 
Supported 
3 There is a curvilinear relationship between 
Information Diversity of the board and the 
firm’s innovation and this should be reflected 
in an inverse U shaped relationship 
Supported 
4 There is a curvilinear relationship between 
governance experience diversity of the board 
and the firm’s innovation in an U shaped 
relationship. 
Not Supported 
5 Board size will moderate the curvilinear 
relationship between Demographic diversity 
and innovation such that the relationship will 
be stronger in larger boards 
Not Supported 
6 Board size will moderate the curvilinear 
relationship between Information experience 
diversity and innovation such that the 




7 Board size will moderate the curvilinear 
relationship between Dynamic capability 
diversity and innovation such that the 
relationship will be stronger in larger boards. 
Supported 
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8 Board size will moderate the curvilinear 
relationship between Governance 
Experience diversity and innovation such 




7.7 Additional Regressions and Observations-  
 
7.7 a Geographic Analysis 
 
While there has been a lot of attention from researchers on board 
diversity, most of the research, especially empirical efforts have been 
focused on the firms that are in the developed world. (Darmadi, 2011). 
This has largely been due to the higher quality of data and ease of data 
availability in the developed geographies. There has been prior 
academic effort which has indicated that diversity and heterogeneity 
effects are different across teams depending upon the geographic 
distribution (Kagzi & Guha, 2018). Some meta- analytic studies have 
shown that differences in regulatory environment, variances in policy 
frameworks and the differences in socio-cultural contexts lead to 
different outcomes. (Post & Byron, 2015).  Different societies and 
differing environments have different outlook towards diversity. We 
therefore executed a set of regression analysis on the same models for 
different geographical dimensions (EMEA, North America, Asia, South 
Asia and LATAM).  The results for the different geographies are 
enclosed in the following tables. The data for LATAM and South Asia 
cannot be effectively interpreted as the sample sizes are extremely 
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small. The residual data indicates that the information diversity and the 
dynamic capability diversity indicate the curvilinear relationship in Asia 
but the other main geographic clusters – North America and EMEA show 
no significant relationship with any of the diversity dimensions either 
direct or in second order. However, the North American firms show 
significant relationship between CEO duality and firm innovation. This 
clearly shows that in the American large firms, innovation is largely being 
led from the top and it is the confluence of decision making at the top of 
the organization that allows the board to operate with high degree of 
cohesion and reduced effects of social categorization. This could also 
be as a result of legitimacy enhancement of the board decisions and the 
effectiveness of signals with a clear direction to management (Galia, 
Zenou, & Ingham, 2015). However, we do want to observe caution on 
the interpretation of geographical results because the very small sample 
of the data as is reduced to only 60, 105 and 28 groups for EMEA, North 






































7.7 (b) Does Regulatory focus on diversity make a difference?  
 
 
There has been regulatory focus across the world in terms of promoting 
diversity at the board and this has been driven by multiple rationales. 
There is the view that there exists a moral and social obligation of the 
board such that the ownership structure should reflect the emerging 
distribution and the heterogeneity of the society (Carver, 2002). There is 
the belief that firms have responsibilities beyond just the shareholder, 
and this wider stakeholder view proposes that the board and the firm are 
responsible to the community and the society as it is the broader society 
that gives the firms the right to exist and operate (Van der Welt & Ingley, 
2003). Over the years, across many countries politicians and regulators 
have instituted quotas and / or guidelines for different types of criteria for 
board composition (Hillman A. , 2015). These include gender and racial 
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quotas, independent director quotas , small share-holder representation 
quotas etc.  To understand whether these factors make a difference in 
the relationship of board diversities with firm innovation, we controlled 
for the countries that are having well defined regulations and guidelines 









The results are in the  following table.  
 














These results moderately reflect the overall results of the analysis and 
support the hypothesis 3,6, and 8 , giving support to the curvilinear 
relationship of dynamic capability diversity with innovation and also 
supporting the moderating effect of board size interaction with 
information diversity and governance diversity.  We do not wish to 
however base any significant analysis based on these results since the 
sample size was very small and included only 21 firms and 48 




7.7 (c) Sectoral Analysis 
 
Another factor that could have an effect on the relationship of diversity 
elements and innovation is the industry sector.  Firms go through strong 
phases of innovation depending upon the competition and also 
regulatory policies and macro trends which are reflective of the sector 
that they operate in.  We used the GICS classification to first identify 
each firm into the 11 sectoral definitions as per S&P/ MSCI GICS 
categories.  These are : 
1. Energy  
2. Materials    
3. Industrials    
4. Consumer Discretionary  
5. Consumer Staples   
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6. Healthcare    
7. IT     
8. Communication   
9. Real Estate    
 
We further classified these into combined comprehensive categories : 
 
1. Commodities/Industrials = Energy+ Materials+ Industrials+ 
Real Estate = 108 observations 
2. Consumer= Consumer Discretionary + Consumer Staples = 
242 observations 
3. Health/Pharma  = Health care = 106 observations 










The most notable observation from the results indicates that 
demographic diversity has a moderately significant curvilinear 
relationship with firm innovation for the Information technology sector. 
We see that the demographic diversity has no significance for innovation 
in other sectors or in the overall analysis.  
 
The dawn of the internet and the new century has forced a view that 
modern digital technologies have blurred the boundaries between males 
and females and unlike the patriarchal nature of industrial technologies 
they have changed the locus from social hierarchy to knowledge, 
allowing the woman the ability to bring the female difference to the fore 
(Wajcman, 2007). The impact of age with respect to technology has to 
be viewed from the TPB ( Theory of planned behaviour ) (Morris & 
Venkatesh, 2000).  As the psychological processes decline with 
increasing age, the ability to handle complex information and technology 
is negatively impacted,  the performance on fluid intelligence task is 
reduced with age (Morris & Venkatesh, 2000)  and thereby age is 
supposed to have a negative impact on use and attitude towards new 
technology. Therefore, when the board of directors has higher age 
diversity, the younger board members provide the stronger orientation, 
attitude and understanding of the strategic issues. Therefore, we believe 
that as a combined effect, the demographic diversity has a significance 






7.7 d Sectoral analysis – Secondary interaction for each diversity 
and board size  
 
 
We also proceeded to review the board size interaction with each of the 
diversity and innovation relationships for different sectors , to better 
































The second order- board size  interactions also indicate that it is only the 
technology sector, where the moderating effect of the board size is 
significant across all diversity and board size interactions.  
  
 139 
7.8 Inter diversity interaction: 
  
We also reviewed the interaction effect of the various diversity elements 
(our independent variables) with each other. It was important to better 
understand the interactions given the multiplicity of various forces at play 
given the board dynamics and the complexity of the decision making. 
 
 





Model 1 Demographic Diversity * Information Diversity 
Model 2 Demog Div * Demog Div* Info Div 
Model 3  Demog Div * Dynamic capability Div 
Model 4 Demog Div * Demog Div* Dynamic capability Div 
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Model 5 Demog Div* Governance Div 
Model 6  Demog Div* Demog Div* Governance Diversity 
Models 1-6 indicate that there is no interaction effect of demographic 
diversity with other diversities. 
 
7.8 b Interaction of Dynamic capability diversity with other 
diversities  
 




Model 1 Dynamic capability Diversity * Demographic 
Diversity 
Model 2 Dynamic capability Div * Dynamic capability 
Div* Demo Div 
Model 3  Dynamic capability Div * Info Div 
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Model 4 Dynamic capability Div * Dynamic capability 
Div* Info Div 
Model 5 Dynamic capability Div* Governance Div 
Model 6  Dynamic capability Div*Dynamic capability 
Div* Governance Diversity 
Models 1-6 indicate that there is no interaction effect of dynamic 
capability diversity with other diversities, except that demographic 
diversity has a significant moderating effect on the curvilinear 
relationship of dynamic capability diversity and firm innovation. This 
probably reflects the effect of social integration theory where in a higher 
demographic diversity leads to formation of groups ( based on gender 
and age) and these groups cause strong biases in terms of views and 
opinions, reduce group participation, risk orientation and cognitive 
quotient, and also lead to poor harmony at the board leading to inefficient 
execution of board policies that would be driving the innovation on a 
positive curvilinear basis with increased dynamic capability diversity. 
Therefore, demographic diversity creates a reverse effect on the 














Model 1 Information Diversity * Demographic 
Diversity 
Model 2 Info Div * Info Div * Demo Div 
Model 3  Info Div * Dynamic capability Div 
Model 4 Info Div * info Div* Dynamic capability Div 
Model 5 Info Div* Governance Div 
Model 6  Info Div* Info Div* Governance Diversity 
The dynamic capability diversity moderates significantly the curvilinear 








7.8 d Interaction of Governance diversity with others  
 
 
Model 1 Gov Diversity * Demographic Diversity 
Model 2 Gov Div * Gov Div * Demo Div 
Model 3  Gov Div *Info Div 
Model 4 Gov Div * Gov Div* Info Div 
Model 5 Gov Div* Dynamic capability Div 
Model 6  Gov Div* Gov Div* Dynamic capability Div 
The demographic diversity has a moderating effect on the curvilinear 
relationship between governance diversity and innovation. Gender 
diversity specially has been shown to have a strong role in promoting 
improved corporate governance. It has also been seen that younger 
board members are more oriented towards environment and corporate 
social responsibility. The governance diversity has a U-shaped 
curvilinear relationship with firm innovation as we have seen from our 
earlier results (though not significant), but we see here that as the 
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demographic diversity of the board increases, the U-shaped relationship 














SECTION 8   SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND THEORETICAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
In our study we have looked at effect of board diversity on firm 
innovation. We have reviewed the nebulous construct of diversity not just 
through the lens of surface level and deep level diversity, but through 
the perspective of the combined experiences of the board members by 
introducing new constructs of Dynamic capability diversity, Information 
diversity and Governance diversity. 
 
We looked at eight different hypothesis each one of which examined a 
different aspect of the relationship between a specific diversity element 
and firm innovation and we also explored the effect of a key moderator 
i.e. board size, on the relationship. 
  
Our results tend to support the theoretical understanding that there is a 
strong basis for board composition as a precursor to firm innovation. 
They also support the thinking that the board interactions and effects are 
multi-faceted and complex and that these involve theories which overlap 
behavioral science, political science and social science. The U shaped 
and inverse U- shaped relationships also give support to the fact that the 
boards diversity operates through multiple mechanisms while impacting 
firm innovation. They demonstrate that diversity of the board reflects a 
strong resource-based perspective by providing cognitive inputs to the 
management process. The results also reflect that board diversity also 
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provides a strong support to the agency-based perspective which is 
based on the need to control and direct the management in line with the 
shareholder requirement and that boards operate at times beyond the 
shareholder view to encapsulate the stakeholder perspective.  Our 
results also indicate that the board diversity also operates through the 
lens of social integration and social identification and board members’ 
groups and biases reflect in their decisions and hence impact firm 
innovation.  
 
The results support the resource based, cognition based, multiplicity 
view and heterogeneity-based perspective of group dynamics, problem 
solving, creativity and board functioning. It supports the view that a high 
level of homogeneity in the views and perspectives of board members 
could lead to reduced level of board-enquiry and that could result in 
idiosyncratic decisions causing reduction in firm innovation (Bernile, 
Bhagwat, & Yonker, 2018). The results also support the arguments 
based on the information perspective which as per the demographic 
literature show that the heterogeneity of a team has a negative effect 
because of the dysfunctional biases and poor communication in a board. 
We are clearly able to see the differing and opposing effects of cognitive 
resource-based perspective AND the social integration and 
communication-based issues arising from the diversity and 
heterogeneity. We are also able to show that these effects while 
generally opposing in nature, are driven in their intensity (and hence the 
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differences in shapes and slopes of the U), by the core underlying nature 
of the specific diversity. 
8.1 Key Insights  
 
8.1.1 One of the most significant outcomes of our research is the 
introduction of the underlying diversity in the form of Dynamic 
capability view of diversity at the level of Board of directors of a firm. 
It is the unique experiences of the board members that reflect their 
dynamic capabilities and hence the dynamic capabilities of the board of 
directors in terms of being able to reconfigure, align, allocate, resources 
available to the firm in order to create innovation outcomes. It extends 
the thinking of the Resource based view of diversity (which focuses on 
the access and availability of special and different types of resources), 
and postulates that it is these Dynamic capabilities to reconfigure and 
realign that are more critical than just access and availability of the 
resources. This research then goes on to define these through the lens 
of leadership, entrepreneurship and academic exposure and then not 
only provides empirical support to the existence of this important new 
relationship, but also provides support to the existence of the curvilinear 
(U) shape of the relationship. 
 
8.1.2  Another significant outcome of this research is the introduction 
of the underlying diversity in the form of Information Diversity at 
the board of directors. The information diversity is based on the 
resource based view but provides a uniquely different compositional 
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dimension to the factors that drive the cognitive vector by not focusing 
on the traditional functional backgrounds or experiential backgrounds of 
board members but by laying the emphasis on the information and 
thinking capability construct driven by heterogeneity of education level, 
the variety of educational institutional backgrounds and the width of 
networks of board members. Once again this research successfully 
demonstrates the strength to our view that the individual members bring 
the cognitive strength of their “informational experiences”, which operate 
in the board environment that allows the individuals to operate with 
natural and group biases, and thereby these have a curvilinear (Inverse 
U) relationship with firm innovation. 
 
8.1.3 Quite surprisingly, our results do not support the arguments that 
differences in views and perspectives based on surface-level 
heterogeneity drivers, like gender and age (demographic diversity) 
should have a bearing on firm innovation. While there have been many 
studies that have been conducted on gender and surface level 
diversities, it is also true that studies have been unable to establish a 
clear relationship between firm performance and gender diversity. The 
lack of support for our hypothesis could be because the potential 
differences arising from surface level diversity of gender and age may 
not reflect itself, as the members providing such diversity would want to 
avoid conflict based on such issues, and would like to behave like the 
majority so as to disprove the tokenism and affirmative action label.  The 
results of the study also fail to provide support to the relevance of 
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governance diversity of board members within and across firms. This 
could be because the board members especially in large global firms 
would be having exposure to board processes due to their previous 
executive roles, and also because the regulatory oversight requirements 
could be standardizing the board experiences. Hence diversity of such 
experiences may not be contributing to cognitive and reflective 
capabilities.  
 
8.1.4 The other key finding of the study was the strong effect of the 
moderating role of the size of the board in terms of the relationship 
between board diversities and firm innovation.  The study indicates 
support to the views that the right approach to analyse the effects of 
board diversity on firm outcomes like innovation should take a 
contingency-view, and therefore such results should also be evaluated  
with respect to organizational contingent parameters (Zona , Zattoni, & 
Minichilli, 2013). In our study the key contingency factor was the size of 
the board, and the results show that larger boards magnify the effect of 
dynamic capability diversity and the effect of governance diversity on 
innovation. It also shows that smaller boards magnify the effect of the 
information diversity on firm innovation. This particular aspect of our 
study further enriches the body of recent research efforts that focus on 
the moderating effects on team diversity ( Bell et al 2011 ) and extends 
the efforts of studying the moderating effects of firm size for board 
diversity (Zona , Zattoni, & Minichilli, 2013).  
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8.1.5  Interaction effects of diversities: Our results also indicate that 
it is important that each of the board diversities should not be looked at 
in isolation in terms of their relationship with firm innovation and that 
combined presence of certain  types of diversities can have a significant 
bearing on the individual diversity and firm innovation relationship. It was 
therefore pertinent to examine the interaction effects of the two key 
board diversities in our study- Dynamic capability diversity and the 
Information diversity. 
 
8.2   Strong supplementary effect of dynamic capability diversity on 
the relationship between information diversity and firm innovation. 
 
Our results clearly demonstrate that when firms have low levels of 
dynamic capability diversity, the information diversity and firm innovation 
relationship is largely flat  and the expected curvilinear relationship 
opportunities tends to be lost, but when the dynamic capability diversity 
of the firm becomes stronger, the information diversity and firm 
innovation relationship tends to become much more effectively defined 
as shown in section 7.8c. This clearly indicates that firms that have 
strong information diversity can enhance or negate the beneficial 
implications of the information diversity and firm innovation relationship 




SECTION 9   ANALYSIS OF OVERALL RESULTS WITH RESPECT 
TO INSIGHTS FROM CEO INTERVIEWS 
 
It is quite interesting to note that while there is unanimity amongst the 
board members with respect to the key importance and high weightage 
expectation of  the “monitoring role” , the board members in general did 
indicate that innovation is a key part of the “strategy” role for the board 
members.  
Board members do believe that there is merit to the overarching concept 
of diversity at the board. However in line with the multiplicity of definitions 
of diversity in the academic world, the board members/ CEOs also had 
widely differing definitions  and understanding of diversity, with some 
having a generic view focused on gender/race , some focused on 
cognition and a few who looked at diversity in terms of the “differential 




CEO/BOD QUOTES- SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESIS / OBSERVATIONS
Key Quotes Underlying Concept Hypothesis positive/negative
1.“Don’t care about where you came from and what 
you look but important is what you know”, 
2.a. “A South Asian origin, Western Passport, 
Woman, in her early forties, PhD, was added to 
board- Got the person with right skills matrix who 
was also a woman”
2 b. “Traditionally ethnicity and gender was first 
pillar of choice but now Skills matrix is first 
supported by gender/ethnicity”
2c.” Personally I have not felt different because I am 
a woman. Looking for diversity of experiences and 
knowledge and not just gender diversity”  ( Quote 
by a women Board Member)
3.” Diversity of thought is important to get different 
Points of View on the table”
4. “No direct correlation between board size and 
innovation but through governance process that 
becomes difficult”
Information diversity
Demographic/ gender  diversity 
Resource based view
This observation provides support to the RBV view 
and to the hypothesis regarding relationship of 
information diversity & firm innovation. The focus is 
on the multiple sources of information and 
knowledge.
These observations support the observations that 
demographic diversity does not have a significant 
relationship with firm innovation. Difference of 
thought , view and experiences are key , and they 
may come from gender, but the core issue is 
differences of thinking/ perspective from 
knowledge and experiences and capabilities. 
This observation provides support to the RBV view 
and to the hypothesis regarding relationship of 
information diversity & firm innovation.
Supports view that Board size should have  a 
moderating effect and not direct effect on 
innovation
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Cognitive diversity was clearly seen as positive for the board 
effectiveness and for fostering information. Practitioner view was that 
boards with diverse backgrounds lead to improved engagement with 
management, better monitoring of management, and also makes boards 
analyse problems from multiple perspectives. Board members also 
indicated that they do believe that at times the discussions and debates 
do lose focus because of multiplicity of views and while that does get 
resolved generally to arrive at consensus solutions, valuable resources 
and time does get wasted in the process of arriving at this consensus. 
This is generally in line with our results (H2). 
 
Board members felt that softer skills of forging alliances, building 
consensus, aligning risk and reward scenarios, and the ability to pivot 
and extend strategies are important skills. Board members indicated that 
special experiences like high technology, deep academic research are 
generally positive for board knowledge and firm innovation. They also 
had the view that deep specialist expertise/ research expertise on board 
also led to reduction in level of debate as board tends to respect and 
accept “specialist” view rather than challenge it. Board members had 
strong positive views that support the dynamic capability view of diversity 
wherein they felt that board members with prior CEO leadership 
experience, entrepreneurial experience enhanced risk taking capability 
of the board to drive innovation. These observations give partial support 





Board members generally felt that having multiple board experiences is 
beneficial as members can cross-pollinate best practices and share 
networks ( largely anecdotal observations). Board members generally 
believed that vintage on board is not a critical issue as it is the cognitive 
value that drives the input and analysis .They however indicated an 
inverse U relationship ( with anecdotal observations of 3 terms , i.e. 9 
years as optimum) with observations that beyond three terms, the board 
members then tend to protect their position and reduce their monitoring 
role and  risk role. This observation is only partially in line with our 
hypothesis (H4).  
 
Most interestingly, all board members indicated that gender ( 
demographic) diversity allows the board to function with broader 
perspectives and improve overall team participation and engagement. 
Key Quotes Underlying Concept Hypothesis positive/negative
5.” Board members with similar backgrounds 
hangout together, encourage groupism and become 
counterproductive , raise same points”
6 a.  “You cannot supervise yourself, thereby if you 
can’t ask right tough questions , there is impact on 
innovation .But we have examples of both types 
succeeding”
b. “ Never take a guy who has just been CEO and 
make him Chairman” 
7. “I just bring a perspective that is different- , 
unique combination of banking, Venture investor 
and academic “ 
Information diversity is reduced,  diminishes POV in 
debate, reduces innovation
CEO Duality and its effect on innovation
Dynamic Capability View- Entrepreneurial(venture) , 
Academic experiences .
Provides support to the social identity theory and 
supports the curvilinear nature of the relationship 
between information diversity and firm innovation.
The organizations potentially manage the agency 
risk of duality by segregating the task of CEO and 
Chairman and at the same time single leadership 
improves communication and decision making ( 
Boyd 1995). Supports the fact that CEO duality is an 
important control factor for our analysis.
Provides support that Dynamic capability 
experiences as per our hypothesis have an impact 
on firm innovation. 
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They all felt that while such benefits of diversity are important, however 
the cognitive capability element has to be priority in selection. From their 
perspective demography is positive as a supportive condition while 
cognitive aspect is the necessary condition. Even more interestingly, the 
women directors on our panel tended to see themselves as “non-gender” 
representatives who are there only on the basis of their “cognitive” or 
“special” experiences. This is partially in sync with our observation of the 
moderating effect of demographic diversity on dynamic capabilities. We 
believe that this relationship has interesting ramifications for gender-
based board regulatory policies and this will have to be explored in more 





Key Quotes Underlying Concept Hypothesis positive/negative
8 “The person who is the domain / subject matter 
expert, tends to drive more of the conversation, and 
views and opinions get more weightage- “Who know 
the area better”
9. “One person ticks more than one box- international 
diversity, global experience AND female !!!”
10. “Diversity is not just about gender or race.. It is 
about diversity of thinking and diversity of 
knowledge/ information and connectivity –e.g. public 
policy”
11. Entrepreneurs have different capacity to take risk, 
willingness to take a shot goes up viz a viz people who 
have always been in a secure job environment, and 
this willingness and appetite for risk taking is a key 
attribute for innovation.
12. “CEO presence is helpful as they understand the 
context of the issues “
13. Have a Board member with PhD but also has 
entrepreneurial and VC experience. Difficult to break 




Information diversity / networking
Entrepreneurship / Dynamic Capability View 
Leadership/ Dynamic Capability View
Dynamic capability View
Provides support to our hypothesis wrt the curvilinear 
relationship of information diversity and innovation. 
Subject matter expertise provides specialist view and 
better analysis ( positive) but also reduces debate ( 
negative).
Demographic diversity by itself is not seen as key 
driver but as support , as our observations are 
showing. 
Provides support to our hypothesis that diversity of 
information and networking has key relationship with 
firm innovation.
Provides support that Dynamic capability experiences 
( Entrepreneurship component) as per our hypothesis 
have an impact on firm innovation
Provides support that Dynamic capability experiences 
( Leadership component)  as per our hypothesis have 
an impact on firm 
Provides support that Dynamic capability experiences 
across multiple components  as per our hypothesis 
have an impact on firm innovation.
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With respect to the moderating effect of board size,  the view among the 
interviewed board members was that a moderate board size of around 
10 members was optimal, and board size moderating effects would  
depend upon the nature of the challenges being faced by the board and 
the nature of board composition. This observation gives strong validation 
to our moderating role hypothesis. 
 
In relation to control factors, the interviewed panel was largely in strong 
agreement on reflecting their opposition to the concept of CEO-duality. 
They felt that CEO duality reduces level of debate, has a negative effect 
on monitoring and hence affects performance and innovation. Only in 
rare anecdotal instances wherein the dual-role performing executive is 
a uniquely skilled individual, does the concentration of power lead to high 
risk taking, faster and effective resource allocation, supported by 
effective management execution to bring about innovative 
organizational success.  
Key Quotes Underlying Concept Hypothesis positive/negative
14.a. Duality is a challenge to innovation if board 
sees role as corporate policeman, and it is positive 
if board sees role as value creation .
14 b. Management is normally vested into all 
proposal it makes to board and in case of 
differences, duality opens ground for discussion and 
allows multiple POV even though efficiency and 
speed of decision/ execution is other way around”
CEO Duality The organizations potentially manage the agency 
risk of duality by segregating the task of CEO and 
Chairman and at the same time single leadership 
improves communication and decision making ( 
Boyd 1995). Supports the fact that CEO duality is an 
important control factor for our analysis
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SECTION 10   MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The observations from this study can help us further improve the 
understanding of the influence of the characteristics of board members 
on the innovative performance of the firm and hence can have 
interesting managerial implications.  
 
10.1 Our empirical results are suggesting that firms should endeavour to 
build a board that comprises of members that provide it a higher level of 
dynamic capability diversity and of information diversity. It is important 
therefore for firms to invite people who have strong dynamic capability  
oriented experiences i.e. founders and entrepreneurs, leaders and 
CEOs and academics and researchers to join their board. They should 
also ensure that the board is not an “old school” club, and board 
members must provide backgrounds across multiple educational 
institutions and provide different levels of educational experiences and 
identify board members who have strong external networks. 
 
10.2 However, it is very critical that firms must keep the U shaped 
curvilinear relationships and the contingency view in mind and should try 
and optimize their operational diversities – dynamic capability diversity 
and informational diversity in that context rather than simply increasing 




10.3 It is also important that firms should keep the board size as a key 
operating variable given the important moderating role of the board size 
as demonstrated by this research and forms should manage the size of 
the board depending upon their dynamic capability diversity and their 
information diversity and their ongoing innovation objectives. 
 
 
10.4 We also see empirically that it is important that the firm must look 
at the inter-relationships of the different diversity elements. So while 
demographic diversity may not have a key primary effect on firm 
innovation, but for firms that have high elements of dynamic capability 
diversity, firms should keep a low level on demographic diversity to 
maximize the innovation opportunity because  for large demographic 
diversity, the dynamic capability diversity relationship with firm 
innovation tends to be flat in nature.  
 
 
10.5 Our research also provides some empirical evidence that there are 
certain complimentary interactions possible between the presence of 
different types of diversities . For example, we see the significant 
interplay of the moderating effect of demographic diversity on dynamic 
capability diversity and governance diversity.  
 
Therefore, it is vital  to understand that there we need to consider the 
different types of diversities at the board to comprehend the effect of 
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board composition on firm innovation AND that the board should be 
composed in a manner that encapsulates the fact that a change in one 
particular characteristic and diversity could and will in all probability 






















SECTION 11    IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
 
Our findings have several implications for research. One such 
implication is related to the perspective on gender and demographic 
diversity. There has been influential research that has indicated in the 
past that “in spite of the popularity of demographic heterogeneity as a 
topic there is little consensus about how it affects performance”.  Our 
research supports a review and adjustment to the gender and 
demographic diversity ( of the board of directors) relationship with firm 
innovation ( and thereby firm performance). Furthermore, given that 
many prior studies of such relationship have been based on cross 
sectional  analysis, our results implore a deeper look at the issue of 
gender and demographic diversity which is currently gaining popular 
traction due to its political dimension. 
 
There have been many studies that built linkage between diversity of 
cognitive knowledge and innovation capability but these generally 
overlooked the value of the “intangible assets” of a firm (Teece, Pisano, 
& Shuen, Dynamic capabilities and strategic management, 1997) 
(Ostergaard, Timmermans, & Kristinsson, 2011). Our research is 
bringing to focus these intangible assets, i.e. the “dynamic capabilities”, 
specifically with respect to the board of directors and introduces the 
importance of the diversity of dynamic capabilities of the board in driving 
innovation. This relationship needs to be explored further to provide solid 
validation.  
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SECTION 12  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  AND DIRECTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
While our study gives some interesting insights and strong empirical 
support for a complex issue such as board diversity, it does leave certain 
interesting questions unanswered.   
 
One of the issues with our study is that is has been limited to large multi-
national firms and so it does not allow the results to be generalized 
across a large cross-section of firms. It would enhance our confidence 
in the robustness of our results if we could extend this study to medium-
sized firms. 
Also, while we did a set of extended interviews with global CEOs to 
validate some of the key underlying effects and the causal relationships 
of the effects of the diversity constructs that we have identified, we 
believe that a few intensive organizational case studies by embedding 
with the boards may be required to inform us of the processes that are 
involved in the board interactions.   
 
We have used the approach of aggregation of diversity elements to 
define our diversity constructs. However, there is lack of consensus on 
the best way to look at the issue of compositional elements. We have 
considered each dimension to carry equal weight, while the impact of 
the individual elements could be different in strength.  
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While we have taken into account many factors that define heterogeneity 
of the board and characteristics of the board and the firm, we have not 
taken into consideration the specific issues of personal incentives which 
could have an effect on the level and quality of individual board member 
participation in board decision making and hence on firm innovation.  In 
addition we have not factored in the longevity of the CEO and of the 
board chairman, both of which could have potential effect on board 
dynamics. We would appreciate if this study is extended to better 

















SECTION 13: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This research has examined the complexity and dynamic nature of the 
diversity of the firm’s board of directors and its ability to achieve 
innovation. Our research examined the issue of board diversity beyond 
the traditional approach of surface level and deep level diversity and has 
introduced the concepts of dynamic capability diversity and information 
diversity of the board.  
 
The theoretical development and the empirical evidence in this research 
provide evidence through its findings that the dynamic capability 
diversity and the information diversity of the board of directors have a 
significant relationship with firm innovation. This research also examined 
the two opposing effects of diversity namely the positive effect of the  
resource/ multiple-perspective view and the negative effect of the Social 
identity led view. The research thereby goes on to provide evidence of 
the curvilinear nature of these diversity and innovation relationships. 
 
The findings of this research also provide support to the moderating role 
of the size of the board of directors on these relationships. In addition 
the research also demonstrates that the interactions of these board 
diversities amongst each other, play a key role in determining the nature 
of diversity-innovation relationships.  
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The research findings contribute to improving the understanding of the 
effect of board composition from a firm innovation perspective and 
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Annexure 1  
 
Hypothesis validation : One external in depth interview  
Key Observations from Interview 1  
 
1. Board’s key role is to choose management, monitor management 
and do resource allocation. 
2. Difference in experiences for BMs is vital. 
3. Discussions happen more at committee level than at Board level. 
4. Social engagement amongst board members helps to build trust. 
Trust helps to get sharing of views 
5. Key attributes in selection of BMs- Skills, Stature, Chemistry and 
style of working 
6. Same background/ Known people – Lopsided discussions 
7. Relative Power of board members and also viz management 
matters.  “Asian Board members avoid conflict” 
8. Differences in backgrounds cause conflict- PE vs Govt 
background. But same is not the best.  
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9. Gender is important but not at cost of quality 
10. Large boards – less ideas as reduced participation, lower quality 
of discussion 
11. Small Boards – Not enough experiences, views.  So, there is a 
diminishing return of size 
12. International exposure is good for diversity/innovation- 
multicultural approach 
13. Entrepreneurship is useful (Though limited) 
14. CEO Duality – inhibits innovation “Jamie Dimon is an exception” 




Summary of Validation Interviews post analysis  
 
1. Many board members/ CEOs observed that the role of the board 
is generally to monitor the management (in line with the agency 
theory), and at the same time also provide key strategic inputs on 
opportunities and challenges. Boards do see themselves as 
having excessive regulatory oversight and so they see meeting 
the regulatory objectives and risk objectives as primary and 
driving innovation as a next level objective as subset of strategic 
direction and financial resource allocation. 
2. Key issue is to be able to clearly identify role of TMT and role of 
board and reduce overlap.  
3. Boards generally encourage risk taking by the management and 
support getting different points of view from the management to 
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be able to debate. Boards do not appreciate unitary 
recommendations by management.  
4. The board should not just reflect variety in skills ( that is more a 
requirement for having specialists in TMT ), still the variety and 
heterogeneity in functional experience is useful at the board , 
largely to ensure that key areas like risk, finance , technology, 
customer experience etc. are well understood by the board as a 
unit. 
5. Boards look to compile for themselves broad expertise of skills, 
institutional knowledge, professional networks and 
business/industry relevant expertise. 
   
6. Board engagement is dependent on the intra group chemistry of 
the board. That has a big impact on board member participation.  
Groupism on board is prevalent but 
Board members in general understand the importance of 
engaging with each other. However, they do seek social/ 
experiential support when they give opinions so as not be seen 
as “dramatically divergent”. Consensus is the preferred way. 
Largely driven by self-protection.  
7. Boards tend to generally agree with their own subject matter 
expert. That tends to reduce the quality of debate on an issue.  
8. Progressive CEOs focus on building social engagement amongst 
board members. X functional teams on boards helps to get 
sharing of views and build intra-member trust. 
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9. Asian board members tend to avoid disruptive conversations and 
engage with Chairman/ CEO on sidelines for controversial/ 
divergent views. 
10. Small boards have excellent discussions, but their limited 
knowledge makes them seek external advisory views and they 
become restricted and limited by those. 
11. Larger boards are operationally dysfunctional, have 
“unnecessary participative debate” driven by ‘desire to be seen 
as contributing to discussion”, and cause unnecessary delays in 
decision making. Moderate board size- 10-11 is considered as 
most optimal. 
12.  Friendly nominations are negative catalyst to board discussions 
as they promote group think and reduce debate on the issue with 
quick group alignment votes. 
13. CEO Duality is generally a hinderance to POV (points of view on 
the board) and leads to “ineffective review of management 
strategy”. 
14. Specialized skills are becoming more important, especially in 
technology led companies. 
15. Racial issues are relevant to a minimal extent and that too maybe 
in the US. Gender is more seen as a “good to have/ ought to 
have”, but the focus is on getting the “person” with the right skills, 
experience and capabilities.  
16.  Conflict is not seen as good, but difference of opinion is 
welcomed.  
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17. Differences in backgrounds cause conflict- PE vs Govt 
background. The risk vs innovation, short term vs long term view 
become evident in such conversations. These are welcomed in 
the boards.  
18. Old boys club is still largely personal connection club, though no 
longer boys only. Association with CEO is a big issue on quality 
of analysis and quality of debate.  
19. Entrepreneurship is a great experience to have. Lessons from 
failure are critical. But this trend is not yet well represented in 
boards.  
20. Some boards have 360-degree view on each other. That 
promotes transparency and improves dialogue. 
 
Annexure 3. 
 Transcript of In depth interview  
 
Ajay Makhija Hi XXXX, Good morning, thank you so much for doing the session. I really 
appreciate your time. I know it's difficult to get time with people like you. Thank you so much for 
this. Just to give it a recap of the conversation that we had and the personal document that you 
signed. This is really intended towards having a discussion to get your views around the topic of 
my research, which I'm doing for my PhD program at SMU. My research area is focused on 
understanding the relationship between diversity of a board in a public limited company and how 
it has a relationship with innovation in an organization both being hot topics today. So, I'm just 
trying to gather experiences of people who have been on boards and you have multiple such 
experiences. So, let me begin by just asking you- How do you as a board member, look at the 




Board member 1 Well, I think, you know, in general, what you do is the 
epicentre of innovation and new things, you know, or even running day 
to day. It's about management first of all. So, the most important thing is 
to make sure that you have the right management team in place, 
because as a board member, you can you know, be provocative in terms 
of questions and, you know, you can ask for benchmark. You can look 
at new trends. But at the end of the day, I think the most important thing 
the board's going to do is to make sure that  
 a. you have the right management in place and  
b.  You focus the discussion, at least at some frequency, because, you 
know, there is a lot of routine stuff to cover in board meetings and you 
know most board members are very busy people.  
So, you just have to consciously kind of walk a few sessions a year 
where this is the topic and you don't have anything else that crowds out. 
You know, this approval, that approval and particularly since I'm in 
financial services, there's lots of compliance stuff that comes up. Right. 
So, having the right management and then creating the space, which 
forces the discussion is the best way to do it? I mean, you got to 
remember, board is not management and board cannot micromanage. 
And if it is doing that, then you don't have the right people in place.  
 
Ajay: So, I agree with that. So, as a board member, your one job is to make sure that the right 
people in the management, but also that you focus a conversation which is with the management 
in terms of setting objectives and processes around that. So, when you set those processes, 
how do you as a as a team of board members, which may be ranging from what 8-10-12- fifteen. 
Right. I'm guessing on that level. How does that decision-making process go about? How do you 
look at this?  
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Board member 1: You start with the objective? I mean, then you have a 
plan that you want to achieve for the next day / year and that has 
financial elements to it. And then it has various other elements to it. 
Customer service, cost management this that and another. And you 
therefore basically work on, you know, you when you have a strategic 
plan discussion, for instance, you ask what's going to drive? You know, 
you don't just you know, what technology will you bring that will improve 
the customer experience? What is it that is going to drive increased 
cross-sell. So, what is it that's going to drive better scoring of credit 
applicant? So, you have a whole bunch of objectives. And within that, 
then you essentially look at management and say Ok, what is it that's 
going to drive you to make it happen? And sometimes we wouldn't get 
some people from outside like a consulting firm or somebody who does 
a report, which is more genetic and then you try to adapt it. But I keep 
repeating myself, which is that it is at least the boards I've been part of 
do not spend incredible amounts of time playing to think it for 
themselves, they come with their background. If you have a sufficiently, 
you know, board with  different experiences like for example, in one of 
the boards and we have a guy who used to be very senior at Cognizant 
and doesn't have a financial background but he comes with a lot of 
technology background, you know, so people will then react to things 
that management is talking about. But each of these has to be driven by 
what key objectives for the firm. So, for instance, in customer service, 
you want to you know, you see that you are lagging behind others or do 
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you feel that you can, you know, increase your level of engagement with 
the customer? And ABC ways. So, you just focus on those and say how 
are we going to do this? I mean, in credit card business in India, you 
know, we had a whole bunch of issues associated with how the call 
centres were dealing with the routine stuff. Right. So, using bots and 
using self-dealing stuff, doing proactive messaging, etc. you dealt with 
70 percent of that stuff went away. And then you do what, you know, left 
the people for doing good stuff.  
 
Ajay Makhija So let me let me focus your thoughts on that. How did these decisions on choosing 
these bots or these solutions?  
 
 
Board member 1 I think our job was to make sure that they got the 
budget on. First of all, we challenged them for it and then we make sure 
that we give them the resources forward. We made sure that, you know, 
they did not fudge between operating expenses and investment 
expenses. So, this was sort of monitored separately and we tracked it.  
 
Ajay Makhija: So, when this proposal comes to you that you want to invest in something. And 
this is a significant investment with a certain pay out. And with the certain pay back in terms of 
the customer experience or other financial opportunity, like you mentioned in bigger credit 
scoring. All right. So, in this discussion is happening at the board, not that's really the resource 
allocation part that you are doing. And that is setting the agenda for innovation for the 
organization. So, when you do that in those debates, in those conversations, how do the different 
views emerge? How do you look at that? How do you look at the board composition impacting 
those discussions and how do those decisions get taken? Is there any value? Is it any specific 
process or is it engagement? How does it go about?  
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Board Member 1: Every board is different, I guess. So, I don't think that 
is one standard thing we can apply to everybody, and obviously the 
discussion that emerges is based on a couple of factors. One is the 
composition of the board- who comes and with what experiences, and 
that makes a difference. The second is what are the structure? Very 
often the boards have committee structures, correct. So, you may have 
well, in our technology steering committee or you may have whatever. 
So very often a lot of that discussion happens in those committees as 
the boards typically don't meet for very long. Right. And there's a long 
list of things to go on. So, typically those happen through specific 
committees where, you know, if you are running the thing properly, you 
want to do it with the right kinds of experiences relevant to that area. So 
you may have somebody from technology, you may have somebody with 
people or a HR background you may have an accounting person. So, it 
depends on the different types of committees. The problem you're trying 
to solve, but I don't think there is one we don't have at least I haven't 
seen on all the boards had been that we'd have a structured process that 
works everywhere.  
 
Ajay Makhija It cannot be it cannot be a one-size-fits-all. So, when you have people with different 
experience and so now there's a lot of talk around, you know, these experiences give different 
levels of engagement during the subcommittee meetings or during the full board meetings. But 
in those conversations, have you come across situations where there is collusion of thought in 
one or two directions. And then there is differences of opinion. And how do those differences 
operate?  Are there other issues beyond just simple direct skill? experiences? Other things which 
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are involved in the engagement of groups different interests do you see across those situations 
competing interests, other thoughts, which are there? 
 
Board member 1 Everyone can not inherently stand on where they sit 
...know where what their background is, what constituency, who they are 
representing. Sometimes you will have representatives of the promoters, 
some of them who will have independent directors who are friends with 
the promoters. Sometimes you may have somebody from a previous 
management. So, it is there will always be different views. Depends on 
the culture you create in the board discussions. Very often it is quite you 
know, it can be quite direct that two three people who are strong. Maybe 
one person usually and everyone kind of gives an opinion, but it doesn't 
necessarily push doesn't want to prolong the discussion. That's whether 
there are other boards where people encourage this engagement and 
that is back and forth. And people ask, why don't you go in and check 
what happened here? So, it depends not just on whether people come 
with different backgrounds, but also the comfort with each other. If it is a 
very formal one of people don't know each other. If you don't create 
social engagement between the people cetera, then it is one of those 
things you show up at, attend, then you'll say a few things, you know, 
then they will do what they want to do. They don't really care so much. 
But if there's good engagement, if people are you know, they can of trust 
each other. And so, they did feel free to give their views. Then it comes. 
And to me, that is even more important than having diversity of thought.  
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Ajay Makhija So interesting couple of points that you raise, let me take deeper with you on that. 
So, when you say that there is engagement, people know each other, there is comfort. Right. So 
how what defines, what drives this comfort? Is it coming from previously knowing each other? Is 
it coming from working together in a group? Is it coming from gender?  
 
Board member 1:  The tone that the Chairman sets and how often the 
chairman basically seeks to pull information, I think that's number one. 
Number two would also depend on how the board has been constituted. 
There are different ways to construe boards. And, you know, if it's been 
done in the way that you keep in mind the overall dynamics and interest. 
And the third thing is whether you will consciously work to some efforts 
around bringing the team together even in informal situations. So, having 
some sort of offsite with the directors, well, once in a year, doing the 
strategy plan around that and to let people engage both at the social 
level. In addition to coming to the board meeting, spending a few hours 
and leaving   
 
Ajay Makhija So interesting point to me is about, how the board is constructed. So, give me your 
thoughts on how it is constructed. Your experiences. 
 
Board member 1: Well, the challenge  with constructing boards is that, 
you know, that  particularly in public companies, you don't have the 
ability to change the board where you step in when at the point in time 
you can just change it because, you know, that is a good thing, because 
otherwise there would be no independence at all. And you could just fill 
it up with your cronies. Right. But on the other hand, who inherited this 
stuff? So, you know, you can only make incremental decisions. So, you 
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look at you look at, you know, the first question is that what are you 
looking for in a board? Sometimes you want someone who has strong 
technical skills in a particular area. You certainly want people with stature 
so that when they speak, you know, others will listen. So, you kind of 
look at that. You then look at how they have worked in their life, at the 
operating style, you know what people who work with them say about 
that. Number four, you meet them and see if chemistry works, because 
at the end of the day, you may have all of that, but the chemistry may 
not work. And then I think it's important for the management CEO to be 
comfortable with the board with the person you're bringing in.  
 
Ajay Makhija So when you look at these facets, do you find sometimes boards being heavy on 
certain areas on. But then what happens with those decisions?  
 
Board member 1 issue Is that they recruit people that they know from 
their own background, therefore they get lopsided. And, you know, 
clearly then, you know, decision making gets lopsided. You focus on the 
same thing. You think alike, less likely that you will come up with a 
different way of approaching a problem.  
 
Ajay Makhija: And all these, in your view, do that really at the board level at least some impact 
on the decision making in innovation? Or is it that even if it happens, the management really 
need to do what they have to?  
 
Board member 1: Depends on the relative power of the individuals 
involved  
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There are some managements which will have a rubber stamp of a 
board. You can make it as diverse as you want. But if the CEO is, you 
know, very powerful and, you know, those typically end up badly, 
extremely powerful CEOs who have been there for a long time. Don't 
listen to anyone, going anywhere. I mean, that maybe one or two 
examples where they did, but sooner or later they go kaput. So, it all, 
you know, contextually, therefore, just having diversity is not enough. 
Allowing diversity to have a say is more important in my view. So, in 
particularly Asian boards, I think it's incredibly important that the people, 
you know, generally people want to await conflict. Board is one of those 
positions when you kind of think of yourself as an advisor or whatever. 
And so, people do not want to engage in over 70 percent of the time, or 
they don’t get into conflict. So, if the culture doesn't allow for a discussion 
and if, you know, there are strong personalities and they do not provide 
enough encouragement for it, that's a problem.  
 
Ajay Makhija So you also mentioned something about trust. Right.  
So, do you see diversity helping in trust formation or how is the relationship between diversity 
and trust and innovation exist in your in your experience?  
 
Board member 1 You know it, but inevitably you'll have to put a little bit 
more effort to build connection if there is a lot of diversity. If you have 
known people from extremely different background, you've got 
somebody just as an example from the government, then you'll get 
somebody from hard judging private sector. It is you know, people come 
with preconceived notions. Right. So, it is it I'm not saying it's going to 
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be big issue. When I have seen this, for example, I have seen in SBI 
Card Board, but it takes effort. People who have views, you know, I I'm 
from private equity and people will think of me as someone who wants 
to maximize profits in the short term. And B, when you know, they will 
come and say, we are looking at the long term and we have to think of 
social this and all. And so, there is a level of suspicion around diversity 
and it is incumbent on the people to gain trust and that takes time. Now, 
if everybody on the board had some private equity background, then, 
you know, if you have that emotion, then you trust them, work with, in 
terms of, you know, his interests versus my interests. But you speak the 
same language in that sense. So, on the surface, therefore, if you have 
people who are similar, it might be easier to build trust. But it kind of 
masks your ability or it inhibits your ability to be better because there 
was the three of you doing/thinking the same way doesn't necessarily 
mean that you are doing better.  
 
Ajay Makhija So among other things that we really look at on this topic is this whole thing around 
regulatory engagement in monitoring how boards should be constituting on certain affirmative 
action and things related to that. What are your thoughts and experiences on that? 
 
Board member 1 [00:17:46] I think that was probably, you know, look, 
ideally you would want it to happen naturally. But I think there is some 
benefit. Enforcing it at least until it becomes natural. You know, that is 
most often people you know, the most easy way to do this is gender, 
because other areas are there was not that visible. Can we have some 
of them aren't that visible. And I think it's a fact that most boards are 
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men. So, for people to therefore say that, you know, it doesn't make a 
difference, it's hard to tell because you haven't tried it. And I think that 
there is value in forcing it up to a point. No, it should not become forever. 
And hopefully over time, this will become less and necessary. But the 
natural tendency for people is to reach out to the people they know 
they're comfortable with. And so I have no problem in having some level 
of affirmative action. I wouldn't call it a forced one, where people go to 
look not for a weaker candidate, but, force them to look for good 
candidates and that there are good candidates, just that you have to 
make the effort.  
 
Ajay Makhija [00:19:01] So when then these boards interact, you know, they have a complex 
decision to make. You are now that there is divergence of views. There is also the overall culture, 
the management process, all these things combined together are there. And it's not a unitary 
process. It's not a standardized standard operating procedure. All right. But now, from your own 
experience, when you look at board, which are small and board which are large, do you find any 
differences in the way these boards operate? vis-a-vis the outlook towards issues of diversity 
and innovation.  
 
Board member 1 [00:19:47]   Size of the board makes a difference 
towards how the board will operate. Looking at these things, well, by 
definition if the board is large, then it becomes less participatory. Right. 
Because if there are 40, 50 people sitting in a room, it's very different 
from a nine people sitting. And so, all other things being equal. Of 
course, large boards can be participative and small boards can be 
dictatorial. But, you know, all things being equal, I think, you know, there 
is an optimal size, if not too small a board, then, you know, basically it 
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becomes difficult. I think you'll need enough experience which comes 
from different backgrounds. So, in my view, depending on different 
things. So I went around 7to10 is a good number, anything beyond 12-
13 with diminishing returns.  
 
Ajay Makhija And that's an interesting view. Also, let me also ask your 
thoughts on diversity of experience. You say diversity of perspectives. 
You mentioned technology. So that's one area. But generally, what are 
the experiences that you think in the modern world are relevant where 
you say, okay, I would like to have a board which would probably have 
diversity on the following factors. So, what does the idea look?  
 
Board member 1: Clearly, one is international versus being local on 
some level of exposure to different markets.  
 
Ajay Makhija So that's work experience. It's not education. You're talking of work-related 
experience?  
 
Board member 1 Well, I think in a general sense, human living 
experience globally vs living in the same place for ever, I think it makes 
a difference in.  
 
Ajay Makhija How do you think that?  
 
Board member 1 Because you will experience different cultures. You 
experience different ways of doing things. You experience being 
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different vs. being part of the same team. So, I think that having a 
broader world view is helpful. Obviously, in experience and further 
because you see best practice in their best practices. Yeah, so. And 
someone is therefore Geographic sort of exposure. The second is like, 
for instance, we had, you know, we are invested in the life insurance 
company. So, distribution is important, too. So, if you can find people 
from consumer areas, from web marketing areas, it was kind of areas 
where they build distribution in unrelated products, they can provide 
some benefit around those experiences. I think that that is helpful. 
Sometimes having someone who can help you if, you know, particularly 
in financial services, which I do, and one of the most important 
constituency is the government. Right. So, having someone on the board 
who can help provide a perspective of what our government might think 
about an issue or an issue has come up. What's the best way to deal 
with that? I think that is helpful. So, you have to be thoughtful about it. 
Maybe after somebody who's got an audit kind of an experience so that 
when you are looking at issues in audit committee, you have the right 
expertise there. And they said, you know, from a business point of view, 
someone who brings a different perspective on how to service 
customers rather than just someone who has been in the same industry 
geographic experience. And I think gender also should matter.  
 
Ajay Makhija [00:23:28] So in the modern world, in the recent world of “start-ups” and 
entrepreneurship, what's your view about having entrepreneurs on boards of large firms?  
Is it a relevant experience? Is it a useful experience? How do you see?  
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Board member 1 I don't have enough data to sort of speculate. What I 
what I might say would be speculative.  I think that, you know, when you 
bring the entrepreneur on a very large board, that entrepreneur has 
reached a level of scale which is already sort of he's operating in the big 
company environment to some extent. It it's not likely that, you know, 
some start-up, but then people will. And unless you have some prior 
experience when he was part of something bigger. Yes. That 
entrepreneurial piece is not going to in a small context, just starting that 
is not going to propel someone into the board of a large company. 
Barring you know, family relationships and all that sort of. I think just 
bringing one entrepreneur on the board. I'm not sure it can change the 
culture. I'm not sure it'll change. I mean, look, unless the person is the 
chairman or whatever and has lot more authority, I don't think just 
bringing in one who can be challenging, and you can ask to look at 
things. You know, why is it necessary? Why have you always done like 
this, etc.? I don't know.  
 
Ajay Makhija So you've got to work this thing around the chairman and the piece a few times. 
Right. And I'm sure it must be a critical factor. So let me ask you views on things like what in the 
academic world is CEO duality so Chairman /CEO being the same?   
 
Board member 1 I don't like that idea.  
 
Ajay Makhija  And how did the foster/  engage the board process? and innovation ? 
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Board member 1 [00:25:40] I think it inhibits checks and balances. And 
honestly, I think that is a lot to be said about having some level of checks 
and. Because the CEO is also the chairman. It becomes, you know, it's 
harder to have open discussion about issues in the company and not 
because he controls the agenda. So, I'm not  a strong proponent. I know 
that some you know, Jamie Dimon and all of these people have been 
successful or not. But I have seen in my experience, that is a recipe for 
high risk and not necessarily good for the company because no one to 
challenge. So, you know, you're just depending on that one individual 
and only reason to do it is not because it's the better way, but because 
you have a powerful person. So that is a role created for a powerful 
person other than what is best for the company. Good to see you can 
find the agenda any way without being the chairman. CEO can come 
and has the authority So for him to be the chairman also – What’s the 
point. I don't see any substantial reason why that should be except that 
he is too big. And you know, he will not abide by another person who is 
a chair.  
 
Ajay Makhija OK, so last question before I I'm impinging on your time and I'm coming to the end 
of my requested time is between large and small company. Since you have a lot on the boards 
of large company and you're also through your private equity experience, you're on the board of 
a small company. How do you see the role of the board in the context of diversity of the board? 
Right. Driving the future innovation of the company. Different, if in any way.  
 
Board member 1: You know, look, I think when a company is really 
small, the focus has to be on details. So, I don't know if you can afford a 
lot of diversity in many small companies. I mean, you have perhaps you 
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don't people will anyway come from different experiences. And I think it 
become a lot more important as you become bigger because it is easy 
to fall into group think. You know what I wouldn't do even when the kind 
of management you have in small companies, I call it line of sight 
management. You'll have executives who basically want to touch and 
feel everything. And the board should be not exactly the same, but, have 
that same mentality. Whereas in a large company it's about 
empowerment. It's about the structure, the processes. So, I don't know 
that we're sitting in the huge factor differentiating between big and large. 
But if I had to choose, I would say that larger companies get more out of 
diversity because it's easier to fall into groupthink. You are successful. 
You are big. You have all your friends on the board. So, you'd better be 
better off with people who are more different, and you can afford it.  
 







































2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011
CompanyCountry Name Premium Name Premium Name Premium Name Premium Name Premium Name Pemium Name Premium
1 ServiceNow 89.22 1 Service Now 82.46 1 Tesla 82.40 1 Tesla 84.8 1 Salesforce 75.9 1 Salesforce 72.8 1 Salesforce 73 1 Salesforce 75.1
2 Workday 82.84 2 Tesla 78.43 2 Salesforce 75.52 2 Salesforce 77.8 2 Alexion Pharmaceuticals 71.4 2 Alexion Pharmaceuticals 72.3 2 Alexion 72.3 2 Amazon 58.9
3 Salesforce.com 82.27 3 Amazon 72.78 3 Regeneron 72.85 3 Alexion Pharmaceuticals 72.5 3 ARM 65.6 3 VMware 63.7 3 Amazon 58.3 3 Intuitive 57.6
4 Tesla 78.27 4 Shanghai RAAS 71.72 4 Incyte 70.81 4 Regeneron Pharmaceuticals 72.1 4 Unilever 65.1 4 Regeneron 63.1 4 Redhat 58.1 4 Tencent 52.3
5 Amazon.com 77.40 5 Netflix 71.54 5 Alexion pharmaceuticals69.95 5 Arm 69.8 5 Regeneron Pharmaceuticals 64.7 5 Arm 61.2 5 Baidu 57.6 5 Apple 48.2
6 Netflix 71.23 6 Incyte 70.91 6 Under Armour 68.92 6 Unilever 67.9 6 Amazon 62.4 6 Baidu 60.6 6 Intuitive Surgicals 54 6 Hindustan Unilever 47.7
7 Incyte 70.59 7 Unilever 68.59 7 Monster beverages 68.80 7 incyte 67.9 7 Biomarin Pharamaceuticals 58.9 7 Amazon 60.2 7 Rakuten 51.5 7 Google 44.9
8 Hindustan Unilever 67.20 8 Asian paints 68.28 8 Unilever Indonesia 67.93 8 Amazon 67.6 8 CP All 57.8 8 Intuitive Surgicals 53.9 8 Edwards Lifesciences 46.9 8 Natura Cosmeticos 44.5
9 Naver 64.62 9 Naver 65.85 9 vertex Pharmaceuticals 67.89 9 Underarmour 66.6 9 VM Ware 57.6 9 Rakuten 50.7 9 Larsen & tubro 46.1 9 BHEL 43.6
10 Facebook 64.42 10 Regeneron 64.40 10 Biomarin Pharmaceuticals67.43 10 Bio  Marin Pharmaceuticals 65.2 10 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings 57.1 10 Natura Cosmeticos 48.5 10 ARM Holdings 45.4 10 Monsato 42.6
11 Monster Beverage 64.26 11 Unilever indonesia 63.65 11 Amazon 63.80 11 Baidu 64.7 11 vertex Pharmaceuticals 56.8 11 Henan Shuanghui Investment 48 11 Tencent Holdings 44.1 11 Reckitt Beckinser 40.6
12 Unilever Indonesia 63.91 12 Bio Marin Pharmaceuticals 63.57 12 Arm Holdings 63.70 12 Aspen pharmacare holdings 64 12 Redhot 56.4 12 Coloplast 46.5 12 Hindustan Unilever 43.9 12 celgene 40.5
13 Adobe Systems 62.38 13 Monster Beverage Corp 63.16 13 naver internet 63.28 13 Monster Beverage Corporation 63.3 13 Hermes Paris 55.7 13 Cerner 45.9 13 FMC technologies 40.7 13 Nidec 40
14 Celltrion 62.30 14 Adobe 62.75 14 Fleetcor 62.09 14 Catamaran 63.2 14 Hindustan Unilever 54.7 14 Unicharm 43.5 14 Cerner 39.2 14 Terumo 38
15 Autodesk 62.04 15 Autodesk 62.39 15 Netflix 60.34 15 Vertex Pharmaceuticals 62.4 15 Monster Beverage Corporation 54.1 15 Estee Lauder 41.4 15 Pernod Ricard 39 15 Infosys 37.1
16 Regeneron Pharmaceuticals 61.11 16 AmorePacific 61.53 16 Shanghai RAAS 60.17 16 Fleetcor 61.6 16 Priceline.com 52.5 16 Jeronimo Martins 41.3 16 Monsato 38.6 16 Pernod Ricard 36.6
17 Vertex Pharmaceuticals 60.93 17 Vertex Pharmaceuticas 61.41 17 Rakuten 60.02 17 CP All 61.2 17 Rakuten 51.9 17 FMC Technologies 40.8 17 Perrigo 38.3 17 Keyence 36.1
18 Amorepacific 60.81 18 Illumina 58.97 18 Asian paints 59.77 18 Verisk Analytics 61 18 Marriot International 51.7 18 Tencent 40.7 18 Kweichou Moutai 37.9 18 FMC tech 36
19 AmerisourceBergen 58.69 19 Marriot International 58.46 19 LG Household 59.48 19 Rakuten 58.8 19 Fastenal 50.9 19 Starbucks 40.6 19 Infosys 37.7 19 Starbucks 35
20 Illumina 58.33 20 Alexion Pharmaceutical 58.46 20 Verisk Analytics 59.47 20 Shanghai RAAS 58.5 20 Chipotle 50.5 20 Pernod Ricard 40.5 20 Wuliangye Yibin 37.6 20 Nintendo 35
21 Marriott International 58.15 21 CPAll 57.82 21 Amorepacific personal products59.14 21 Naver 58.2 21 Stericycle 50.1 21 Beam 40 21 Starbucks 37 21 Alcom 34.9
22 Alexion Pharmaceuticals 58.04 22 Constellation Software 57.62 22 Coloplast 57.48 22 Hermes Paris 58.2 22 Cerner 49.6 22 Perrigo 39.9 22 Nidec 36.1 22 Activision Blizzard 34.6
23 CP All 57.32 23 Red Hat 57.38 23 Marriot International 56.53 23 Magnit 57.9 23 Coloplast 49.6 23 Essilor International 39.3 23 Estee Lauder 36 23 Beiersdorf 34.5
24 Red Hat 56.93 24 Tencent 57.29 24 Illumina life 55.98 24 Chipotle 57.9 24 Henan Shuanghui Investment 49.6 24 Beiersdorf 38.3 24 Google 35.9 24 Proctor & Gamble 33.4
25 Tencent Holdings 56.77 25 FleetCor 56.85 25 Redhat 55.87 25 The Priceline Group 57.1 25 Tingyi 48.6 25 Grifols 38.2 25 Danone 35.8 25 Essilor International 33.2
26 FleetCor Technologies 56.50 26 Rakuten 56.83 26 Amerisourcebergen 55.63 26 Redhat 56 26 Hengan International Group 48.2 26 Fanuc 37.9 26 Apple 35.7 26 L'Oreal 33.1
27 LG Household & Health Care 55.26 27 Sysmex Corporation 56.24 27 Visa 55.52 27 Netflix 55.9 27 Ambev 47.9 27 Diageo 37.5 27 Proctor & gamble 35.3 27 Schlumberger 32.7
28 Ctrip.com International 53.55 28 LG 56.08 28 Sysmex Health 54.44 28 Amore Pacific 55.3 28 Express Scripts 47.8 28 Hershey 36.2 28 Essilor International 35.2 28 Ecolab 32.6
29 Hermès International 52.38 29 Coloplast 55.52 29 Baidu 54.24 29 Marriot International 55.2 29 Illiad 47.3 29 Danone 35.6 29 TCS 35.1 29 Alstom 32.5
30 Starbucks 50.77 30 Nielsen 54.50 30 Mastercard 54.03 30 Mead Johnson 54.9 30 Netflix 47.2 30 Proctor & Gamble 35.5 30 Reckitt Beckinser 34.5 30 ICL- Isreal chem 32.3
31 Align Technology 50.58 31 Idexx Laboratories 53.25 31 Hindustan Unilever 53.99 31 Valeant Pharmaceuticals 54.8 31 Baidu 46.5 31 Dassault 35.5 31 Ecolab 34.1 31 General Mills 32.3
32 Fast Retailing 50.57 32 Fast Retailing 53.13 32 Hermes 53.68 32 Visa 54.8 32 Mastercard 46.2 32 Colgate Palmolive 35.3 32 Keyence 34 32 CSL 32.1
33 Ihs Markit 50.40 33 Almarai 53.07 33 Transdigm Group 52.11 33 Coloplast 54.7 33 Starbucks 45.6 33 Ecolab 34.6 33 Diageo 33.9 33 Colgate Palmolive 32
34 Expedia 49.82 34 Ulta Beauty 52.46 34 Perrigo Pharmaceuticals 51.97 34 Cerner 54.1 34 Whole Foods market 45.6 34 Monsato 34.3 34 L'oreal 33.6 34 NetApp 31.6
35 Sirius XM Radio 48.90 35 Hermes Paris 52.34 35 priceline 51.88 35 Illumina 53.9 35 Fanuc 44.1 35 Reckit Benckiser 34.1 35 Hershey 33.2 35 Danone 31.5
36 Visa 48.44 36 HIS Markit 50.81 36 Adobe Systems 51.67 36 Mastercard 52.9 36 Illumina 43.7 36 Keyence 33.9 36 Beiersdorf 33 36 Citrix 30.4
37 Anheuser-Busch InBev 47.64 37 Unicharm 50.66 37 Cerner Health care 51.41 37 Stericycle 51.4 37 tencent 43.1 37 Kone 33.1 37 Colgate Palmolive 32.7 37 Areva 30.3
38 Keyence 47.50 38 Verisk Analytics 50.57 38 Luta Beauty Specialist stores51.39 38 fast retailing 51.4 38 Novozymes 43.1 38 Yahoo Japan 32.8 38 Sun Pharmaceutical 32.7 38 Rockwell 30.3
39 Bard 46.80 39 Genmab 50.44 39 Chipotle 51.14 39 VM Ware 51.1 39 SBA Communications 43 39 BRF- Brasil Foods 32.8 39 Citrix Systems 32.3 39 Kone 30.1
40 Oriental Land 46.28 40 Amerisourcebergen 50.27 40 Almarai 50.99 40 Perrigo 50.8 40 Unicharm 42.6 40 TCS 32.6 40 Dassault 31.9 40 China Oilfield Services 30
41 Molson Coors Brewing 46.07 41 Expedia 50.25 41 Fast Retailing Apparel 50.99 41 Hindustan Unilever 50.8 41 Li & Fung 42.6 41 Yum Brands 31.7 41 Technip 31.8 41 Syntheses 29.6
42 Booking Holdings 45.35 42 Starbucks 49.89 42 Starbucks 50.76 42 TransDigm Group 50.5 42 Kone 42.4 42 Teradata 31.5 42 Kone 31.6 42 Juniper Networks 29.6
43 China Molybdenum 45.27 43 Shimano 49.82 43 Unicharm 50.56 43 Keuriig Green Mountain 50.4 43 intuitive Surgical 42.4 43 Praxair 31.4 43 Fanuc 31.1 43 Praxair 28.8
44 Intuitive Surgical 45.18 44 Sirius XM Radio 49.36 44 Sirius XM 49.03 44 Fastenal 50 44 Keurig Green Mountain 42.3 44 CSL 31.1 44 Schlumberger 31 44 Estee Lauder 28.4
45 Baidu 45.15 45 Visa 48.77 45 Iliad Alternative Carriers 48.49 45 Starbucks 49.8 45 Perigo 42.3 45 Anheuser Busch 31.1 45 Nintendo 31 45 Fanuc 28.3
46 Mastercard 44.31 46 Perrigo 48.74 46 Magnit Retail 48.49 46 Cielo 49.8 46 Fast Retailing 42.1 46 Kweichow Moutai 30.9 46 Praxair 30.7 46 Hershey 27.2
47 Falabella 44.09 47 KDX 48.50 47 Autodesk Application 47.97 47 Almarai 48.6 47 RB 40.6 47 Google 30.9 47 Syntheses 3 30.7 47 Avon products 25.9
48 Dassault Systemes 43.76 48 Smith & Nephew 48.12 48 Tencent Holdings 47.84 48 Kone 48.3 48 Brown Forman 40.6 48 L'Oreal 30.8 48 Yum Brands 30.3 48 Paccar 25.7
49 General Mills 43.28 49 Keyence 47.69 49 Shanghai Oriental 47.82 49 Iliad 48 49 Essilor International 40.6 49 Sherwin-Williams 30.8 49 CSL 29.2 49 SMC Corp 25.5
50 Roper Technologies 43.28 50 Global Payments 47.59 50 Lindt 47.75 50 Whole Foods Market 46.9 50 Bureau Veritas Registre International de Classific40.6 50 C trix Systems 30.7 50 General Mills 28.8 50 Pepsico 25.4
51 Intuit 43.17 51 Bard 47.30 51 Reckit Benckiser 47.72 51 Unicharm 46.6 51 Luxxotica 40.5 51 Smith & Nephew 29.8 51 51
52 Essilor International 43.16 52 Mastercard 46.99 52 Cielo data processing 47.68 52 SBA Communications 45.9 52 Beiersdorf 40.4 52 Mondelez International 29.8 52 52
53 Coca-Cola 42.73 53 Magnit 46.81 53 Ctrip.com 47.49 53 RB 45.7 53 Naver 40.1 53 Infosys 29.1 53 53
54 Inditex 42.64 54 ABInbev 46.58 54 Mead Johnson 47.10 54 Amerisourcebergen 45 54 Estee Lauder 40 54 Kellog 29 54 54
55 Edwards Lifesciences 42.13 55 Ctrip.com.International 46.51 55 Shimano Leisure 46.95 55 Tencent 44.8 55 Keyence 39.7 55 Ultrapar Participacoes 28.9 55 55
56 Reckitt Benckiser Group 41.83 56 Oriental Land 46.42 56 Kone 46.93 56 Lindt 44.8 56 Dassault Ssystemes 39.6 56 Intuit 27.9 56 56
57 Experian 41.80 57 TransDigm Group 45.98 57 Dassault 46.72 57 Expedia 44.7 57 tata Group 39.6 57 Technip 27.3 57 57
58 Constellation Brands 41.75 58 Booking Holdings 45.87 58 Expedia 46.10 58 Ambec 44.6 58 Larsen & tubro 39.4 58 Pepsico 27.1 58 58
59 Kone 41.70 59 Lindt 45.85 59 Proseibensat.1 broadcasting45.70 59 Novozymes 44.6 59 Dairy farm international Holdings 39.4 59 Schlumberger 26.3 59 59
60 Brown-Forman 41.69 60 Baidu 45.85 60 Brown-Forman 45.28 60 Capita 44.6 60 Capita 39.1 60 Fresenius Medical care 26.1 60 60
61 Luxottica Group 41.54 61 Intuitive Surgical 45.78 61 SBA Communications 45.16 61 Falabella 44.4 61 Geberit 38.9 61 SMC Corp 26 61 61
62 Mondelēz International 41.28 62 Chipotle 45.74 62 Essilor Healthcare 44.94 62 Essilor International 44.3 62 Jeronimo Martins 38.9 62 Valeant Pharmaceuticals 25.8 62 62
63 Compass Group 41.25 63 Nornickel 45.52 63 Allergan Pharmaceutical44.90 63 Keyance 44.3 63 Falabella 38.8 63 Unilever 25.8 63 63
64 Jiangsu Hengrui Medicine 41.12 64 Dassault Systems 44.11 64 Keyence Electronics 44.24 64 TCS 44 64 Grifols 38.7 64 China Oilfield Services 25.4 64 64
65 Boston Scientific 40.96 65 Roper 43.76 65 Oriental Land Co 44.09 65 Luxxotica 44.9 65 Sun Pharmaceutical Industries 38.3 65 Automatic Data Processing 25.3 65 65
66 Procter & Gamble 40.96 66 Intuit 43.72 66 TCS 43.85 66 Express Scripts 43.9 66 Starwood Hotels and resorts 37.8 66 Carlsberg 25.1 66 66
67 PepsiCo 40.74 67 Brown- Forman 43.64 67 Intuitive Surgical 43.26 67 Shimano 43.3 67 Diageo 37.3 67 Covidien 24.9 67 67
68 Cerner 40.56 68 Essilor International 43.42 68 Fastenal Trading 43.23 68 Brown Foreman 43.2 68 Roper 37.1 68 Bajaj Auto 24 68 68
69 Yahoo Japan 40.38 69 Iliad 43.05 69 Roper Techno;ogies 43.20 69 Geberit 42.9 69 Pernod Ricard 37 69 Tyco International 23.9 69 69
70 Unilever 39.62 70 Inditex 42.86 70 Smith & Nephew 43.05 70 Jazz Pharmaceuticals 42.9 70 Lindt 36.9 70 Novo Nordisk 23.4 70 70
71 Colgate-Palmolive 39.61 71 Equifax 42.72 71 Experian Research 42.96 71 Sun Pharmaceuticals 42.6 71 Amerisourcebergen 36.5 71 Johnson Controls 23 71 71
72 Sodexo 39.59 72 Edwards Lifesciences 42.72 72 Colgate Palmolive 42.82 72 Sonova Holdings 42.6 72 Coca Cola 35.8 72 SAP 22.7 72 72
73 United Parcel Service 39.59 73 RB 42.42 73 Sun Pharmaceutical 42.49 73 Autodesk 42.5 73 SGS 35.8 73 Amphenol 22.6 73 73
74 Cielo 39.16 74 Constellation Brands 42.23 74 Acuity Brands Electrical 42.43 74 Adobe 42.2 74 H&M 35.8 74 Sandvik 22.6 74 74
75 ASML Holding 39.08 75 Pandora 41.91 75 Molson Coors Brewing 42.43 75 Hengan International Group 42.1 75 oriental Land 35.5 75 LVMH 22.6 75 75
76 Paychex 38.55 76 Luxxotica Group 41.87 76 Fanuc Industrial Machinery42.18 76 Dassault Systemes 42 76 Paychex 35 76 Rope Industries 22.4 76 76
77 Clorox 38.22 77 Mead Johnson 41.50 77 Inditex Apparel 42.06 77 Tingyi 41.6 77 Colgate Palmolive 34.9 77 ASML Holding 22.3 77 77
78 Assa Abloy 38.14 78 Bharti Airtel 41.40 78 Luxxotica 42.06 78 Dairy Farm Internaional Holdings40.9 78 Ecolab 34.8 78 Assa Abvloy 22.3 78 78
79 Alphabet 37.91 79 Coca Cola 41.32 79 Sab Miller Breweries 42.03 79 Equinix 40.9 79 Anheuser-Busch 34.6 79 Apple 22.3 79 79
80 Nidec 37.77 80 Geberit 41.30 80 Bard Health care 42.03 80 Inditex 40.7 80 hershey 34.3 80 Air Products & Chemicals 22.2 80 80
81 Fanuc 37.67 81 Cerner 41.23 81 General Mills 41.97 81 Coca Cola 40.5 81 Autodesk 33.9 81 Tenaris 22.2 81 81
82 Allergan 37.59 82 Jiangsu Hengrui medicine 41.15 82 Novozymes Speciality 41.61 82 Colgate Palmolive 40.5 82 Inditex 33.7 82 Precision Castparts 21.8 82 82
83 Hershey 37.56 83 SGS 41.03 83 Edwards Life Sciences 41.30 83 NXP 40.4 83 Groupo Bimbo 33.7 83 Rockwell Automation 21.3 83 83
84 Waste Connections 36.99 84 Yahoo 40.99 84 Equifax 40.92 84 Estee Lauder 40.4 84 Proctor & Gamble 33.7 84 Nintendo 21.1 84 84
85 RELX Group 36.90 85 Molson Coors Brewing 40.98 85 Geberit 40.71 85 Want Want 40.3 85 yahoo 33.7 85 Cameron International 21.1 85 85
86 Larsen & Toubro 36.88 86 General Mills 40.93 86 Capita Human Resource 40.40 86 H&M 40.2 86 Danone 33.6 86 Secom 20.9 86 86
87 Shiseido 36.76 87 Ramsay Healthcare 40.92 87 Falabella 40.38 87 Intuitive Surgical 40.2 87 ST Engineering 33.6 87 Schindler Holding 20.8 87 87
88 Kellogg 36.58 88 Boston Scientific 40.73 88 Liberty Global 40.18 88 Experian 40 88 Inner Mongolia Yili 33.5 88 Campbell Soup 20.6 88 88
89 Republic Services 36.50 89 Proctor & Gamble 40.72 89 Larsen & Tubro 40.00 89 Oriental Land 39.9 89 Sodexo 33.2 89 Kubota 19.9 89 89
90 Hikvision 36.16 90 Falabella 40.61 90 Assa Abloy 39.85 90 Tractor Supply Company 39.9 90 Kuhne+Nagel 33.2 90 Mylan 19.8 90 90
91 China Shipbuilding Industry 36.09 91 Mondolez International 40.60 91 Hangzhou Hikvision 39.75 91 Grouppo Bimbo 39.8 91 General Mills 33.1 91 BG Group 19.8 91 91
92 Bharti Airtel 35.95 92 Compass Group 40.42 92 Constellation Brands 39.74 92 Grifols 39.8 92 BRF Brasil Foods 33 92 Adidas 19.6 92 92
93 Ecolab 35.87 93 Cielo 40.40 93 Coca Cola 39.70 93 Starwood Hotels & resorts 39.8 93 Assa Abloy 32.8 93 Henkel 19.6 93 93
94 L'Oréal Group 35.77 94 Experian 40.39 94 Omnicom 39.67 94 SGS 39.7 94 Nidec 32.5 94 Atlas Copco 19.6 94 94
95 NXP Semiconductors 35.66 95 Pepsico 40.34 95 Paychex Data 39.49 95 nidec 39.7 95 Walmart 32.4 95 Syngenta 19.5 95 95
96 Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries35.64 96 Fanuc 40.25 96 Starwood Hotels 39.47 96 Cognizant Technology Solutions 39.6 96 Bajaj Auto 31.7 96 Pentair 19.3 96 96
97 The Estée Lauder Companies 35.53 97 Colgate Palmolive 40.19 97 ITV Broadcasting 39.38 97 Smith & Nephew 39.6 97 Experian 31.6 97 Kao 19.2 97 97
98 Diageo 35.18 98 McCormick 30.73 98 Church & Dwight 39.33 98 ASML 39.5 98 The Colorox Company 31.5 98 Fidelity National Information Services19.1 98 98
99 Maruti Suzuki India 35.08 99 Labcorp 39.65 99 Grifols biotech 39.04 99 Hershes 39.4 99 Sherwin-Williams 31.4 99 Media Tek 18.6 99 99
100 Norilsk Nickel 34.92 ## ASML 38.94 ## Avic Aviation Engine 39.04 ## Equifax 39.3 ## Digi.com Berhad 31.3 100 Daikin Industries 18.6 100 100
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